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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines and explains emigration from South Africa from 1980 to 2000. 
The paper uses real option theory, the theory of emotions and human capital theory in 
its analysis. The factors expected to impact on emigration are discussed. These are 
institutional restrictions on emigration, violence, government redistribution, wages, 
unemployment and uncertainty. The paper then creates an index of the financial 
incentive to emigrate and uses this index to show that the main driver of emigration 
during the period was the real wage rate differential with politics as a secondary 
cause. It is argued that violence and unemployment probably contributed to the huge 
increases in emigration experienced during the late 1990's. 
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Introduction 
This paper discusses the reasons that South Africans are leaving South Africa and so 
explains trends in emigration. Little economic analysis or even academic research has 
been done on the causes of emigration from South Africa. The research that has been 
done has pointed to numerous causes for emigration. In his book on emigration, Van 
Rooyen uses largely anecdotal evidence to argue that the major cause of emigration 
from South Africa is violence (Van Rooyen, 2001). Kaplan argues that political 
events were historically the major cause of emigration but that economic factors have 
become increasingly important (a point broadly supported in this paper) (Kaplan, 
1998). The Mattes and Richmond paper is extensively discussed in this paper. They 
point to a range of possible factors that could cause emigration, but their emphasis on 
the low numbers of people wanting to emigrate I (Mattes and Richmond, 2000). 
The shortage of previous work in the area means that this paper "starts from the 
ground up" in its analysis. This paper exclusively looks at the impact of incentives 
and motivation on emigration. 
Structure of the paper 
Structuring the paper was complicated by the fact that emigration is inherently a 
multifaceted phenomenon with many different issues impacting on the decision. The 
approach chosen was to present the work in a manner that best enabled the reader to 
appreciate the argument made. The paper broadly follows a structure whereby factors 
that are expected to have impacted on emigration over the whole period are discussed 
first. The paper then moves onto those issues that probably started to impact on 
emigration during the late 1990's. 
The chapters and sections in this paper are briefly described below: 
Chapter 1: Introductory chapter 
This chapter introduces the topic. Its purpose is to clarify data issues and provide the 
basis for later analysis. This chapter presents evidence on emigration trends and 
outlines survey evidence of the causes of emigration. 
Chapter 2: Theoretical Discussion 
The theoretical chapter introduces the theory required to understand emigration from 
South Africa. Certain novel theoretical discussions are introduced. 
Section 1: Section 1 outlines the human capital model of individual decision making 
about emigration. This chapter introduces real option theory to the emigration 
literature. 
I This is probably the result of the atmosphere in which they wrote their paper. They refer to figures 
saying that 75% of the skilled intended to emigrate. With this figure as an anchor point emigration is 
low from South Africa. This says more about the anchor point than the sustainability of emigration 
from South Africa. 
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Section 2: Section 2 outlines the theory of family and group decision making about 
emigration. 
Section 3: Section 3 outlines a theoretical approach to understanding decision making 
about violence and crime. This chapter introduces certain results from psychiatry and 
anthropology into economics. 
Chapter 3 Restrictions on emigration 
This chapter outlines the causes of the trend in emigration from 1980 to 2000. 
Immigration is tightly controlled in the destination countries. This chapter outlines the 
structure of these restrictions and how they have changed during the period under 
reVIew. 
Chapter 4 Financial and political incentives to emigrate 
This chapter presents an index of the financial incentive to emigrate. It shows that 
emigration follows the index quite closely for the period under review. The discussion 
includes the following sections: 
• Part 1: Index of the financial incentive to emigrate 
• Part 2: Using the index to predict emigration 
• Part 3: Sensitivity analysis 
• Part 4: Implications of the model for the age/emigration profile 
• Part 5: The impact of uncertainty during the 1980's and 1990's 
This chapter shows the importance of financial incentives to emigration as well as the 
importance of political events. 
Chapter 5 
Chapter 5 discusses the impact of unemployment and crime on emigration. Both are 
primarily expected to have impacted on emigration in the late 1990's. 
Section 1: Section 1 discusses the impact of unemployment on emigration during the 
late 1990's. It shows that unemployment increased across all age groups, races and 
skill levels. It discusses why this evidence is not contradicted by evidence of a tight 
labour market for the skilled. 
Section 2: Section 2 outlines the levels of crime and violence experienced by South 
African and more particularly skilled South Africans. These results are connected to 
emigration. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusions 
Chapter 6: Chapter 6 concludes the paper by out1ining conclusions drawn in the paper 
and making predictions about the future nature of emigration. 
Constraints faced in writing the paper 
This paper faced numerous data constraints. There is a severe lack of data on 
emigration which makes econometric analysis difficult if not impossible. There is a 
lack of information on who emigrates, and where they come from. Furthermore there 
is a lack of time series data on issues such as skilled wages, skilled unemployment, 
the incidence of government spending and crime. The result is that this paper is 
largely data driven. The mode of analysis and the evidence presented are often made 
in reaction to data problems faced in discussing this issue. 
Lack of prior research 
This paper is written in a context in which there are very few broadly accepted 
reasons for the increase in emigration from South Africa. In light of these issues the 
paper needs to prove many more basic or preparatory points than would be necessary 
in a more mature field. This means that the paper often covers issues that the reader 
may think are self evident. Many readers though would find the arguments 
contentious. 
Contributions made in this paper 
This paper introduces three new arguments. In reaction to the problems experienced 
doing econometric analysis a model of the financial aspects of the emigration 
decision is presented and used to discuss emigration. This model facilitates an 
analysis of the age profile of emigration. Furthermore it allows the first use of the real 
option theory to analyze the emigration decision (real option theory to analyze the 
migration decision has not occurred in the comprehensive literature review 
undertaken for this paper). The use of real option theory was crucial to 
understanding the impact of political uncertainty on the emigration decision. In 
particular it overcame a number of seeming paradoxes that inhibited analysis. Thirdly 
the paper combines empirical results from anthropology and neuroscience with the 
literature on emotions and evolutionary theory. Again this discussion allowed a 
greater understanding of the phenomena discussed as well as the solution of a number 
of paradoxes. This discussion is new in the sense that it has not appeared in the 
literature review undertaken for this section of the paper. This means that it is 
probably new in the economics literature but may also be new in the 
psychology/psychiatry literature. 
Issues not discussed in this paper 
Three issues are not discussed in this paper. The first is the impact of demographic 
forces on the rate of emigration. The second is the impact of taxation and expenditure 
on emigration. The third is the impact of income inequality on emigration. All three 
) 1 
Un
iv
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 T
wn
are expected to be relevant but space, time and data considerations2 meant that they 
have not been included. 
The paper begins with a discussion of the available evidence on emigration from 
South Africa and the reasons for this phenomenon. 
2 Both taxation and expenditure, and the impact of income inequality were left out of the paper due to 
the inability to make firm conclusions based on the available data. 
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Chapter 1: Introductory Chapter 
This chapter introduces the topic. It shows the following: 
• Trends in emigration from South Africa 
• Who is emigrating 
• Survey evidence on why people are emigrating 
This chapter provides the groundwork for the discussion in the rest of the paper. It 
shows that emigration in South Africa increased over the late 1990's. It discusses the 
various reasons that many skilled South Africans are dissatisfied with life in South 
Africa. 
Emigration trends 
There are two sources for time series data on emigration. The first is self reported 
emigration at border posts (including airports). This data is published by the Central 
Statistics services. This data suffers from the cost associated with reporting that one 
expects to emigrate. The cost being that the emigrant has to satisfy the state that they 
are not leaving behind unpaid debts and the like. Furthermore there is evidence that 
the data is being collected less accurately over time. The second source of data is the 
records of immigration in the destination countries. These data are less open to the 
problem of self-reporting since the typical South African emigrant is well educated 
and wants to enter the formal economy of the destination countries. Such emigrants 
have a strong positive incentive to report immigration (Kaplan et al. 1999). The 
Central Statistics Services is expected to be less accurate but shows emigration trends 
back to the 1940's and includes more detailed information on self declared emigrants. 
The data from the destination countries is more accurate but is only available back to 
1987 for the USA and Canada and 1980 for Australia, New Zealand and the United 
Kingdom. 
The graph below shows self reported emigration from South Africa back to the 
1940's. 
Figure 1: Self reported emigration from South 
Africa from 1940 to 1999 
30000 
" 20000 /""""'.. /\. / '" ........ 10000 ../- ~ 
-
-...-
--
"---./ 0 1 -
194094494~95~95~96a96496a97~97898a98498a99~996 
Source: Central Statistics Service 
The graph clearly shows peaks after significant political events. The trend suggests 
that the major political events of the last 50 years have all been associated with peaks 
in emigration. The imposition of Apartheid in 1948, the Sharpville massacre and the 
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banning of the ANC in 1962, the Soweto riots in 1976 and the Rubicon have all been 
associated with local peaks. Since these figures reflect self reported emigration they 
may reflect a certain amount of "protest reporting" as emigrants showed their 
rejection of the state and society. The fact remains though that these figures suggest 
that the highest level of emigration was experienced during the 1970's and not the 
1990's as is commonly suggested. 
The evidence from the destination countries is more accurate but covers a limited 
number of years. The self reported emigration figures suggest that the UK, New 
Zealand, Australia, the United States and Canada absorbed 75 percent of emigrants 
(Kaplan et aI, 1999). Additionally survey evidence suggests that these are the most 
desirable destinations (Mattes and Richmond, 2000). The graph below shows 
emigration figures to the US and Canada, the two smallest emigration destinations 
(Emigration is defined by the UN as an expected stay of two years or more) (Kaplan 
et al. 1999). 
Figure 2: Emigration from SA 
to the US and Canada from 
1987 to 1997 
3500 
3000 ~ 2500 
-
2000 
-
/~~/ 
~ n- -- - -- :.l 1500 CAN 
1000 
500 
0 
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Source (Canada (Kaplan et ai, 1999) ), Source for USA (INS service USA) 
Trends in emigration to the UK are shown in the graphs below. The first graph shows 
the number of immigrants to the UK and the number of South Africans going across 
on working holiday visas (these are not classified as immigrants by UK authorities). 
The second graph shows the number of South Africans being granted permanent 
residence in the UK or Grant of Settlement. 
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The graph below shows emigration to the UK from 1987 to 1999 (UK immigration 
authorities) and the number of South Africans going across on working holiday visas 
(South Africans were only allowed onto the working holiday visa program after 1994 
when South African entered the commonwealth): 
Emigration to the UK and the number of working holiday visas 
35000 
30000 
25000 
20000 
15000 
10000 
5000 
o 
~ UK Emigration 
UK Working Visas 
Figure 1 The above graph shows the number of South Africans emigrating to the United 
Kingdom from 1987 to 1999 and the number of South Africans going to England on Working 
holiday visas. Source (UK Home Office) 
The graph above shows a dramatic increase in the number of South Africans 
emigrating to the UK during the late 1990's. 
The graph below shows the number of South Africans granted permanent residence in 
the UK or Grant of Settlement. 
5,000 
4,000 
3,000 
2,000 
1,000 
o 
UK Grant of Settlement 
---+-- UK Grant of 
Settlement 
Figure 2 The graph shows the number of South Africans given permanent residence in the UK 
(Source UK Home Office) 
The graph again shows a dramatic increase in the late 1990's. 
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The graph below shows New Zealand and Australian emigration figures from 1980 to 
2000 and 2001. 
Einigrction to Australia and tew Zealand 
axo r-----------------------------------------~ 
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3XO +--=~~~-~L--_1~-----~=-=-----__I 
2(XX) -1-----\,--
1~ +_--------------~------~~4_------------__1 
o~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ w ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 
--+-- N:lw Zealand 
_ Australia 
Figure 3 The above graph shows the number of South Africans emigrating to Australia and New 
Zealand from 1980 to 2000. Source New Zealand Statistical Services and the Australian 
Department of Migration and Multicultural Affairs. 
The three graphs above clearly demonstrate an increasing rate of emigration from 
South Africa during the 1990's. 
The proportion of emigrants going to the different destination countries in 1997 is 
shown below: (figures from Kaplan et aI, 1999): 
Emigration destinations 
[]UK 
. US 
o CANADA 
oNZ 
IIAUS 
oOn-tERS 
Figure 4 The graph above shows the proportion of South Africans emigrating to the different 
destination countries. Source: Kaplan et ai, 1999 
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As the graph shows the two destination countries with the highest emigration figures 
are Australia and the United Kingdom. This paper will evaluate the reasons for 
emigration to all five major destination countries. Due to data and space constraints at 
times the paper will narrow its focus to a selection of these destination countries. 
Of those emigrating approximately 45% are professionals, 15% are managers and 
33% have other qualifications (Kaplan et aI, 1999). Thus the emigration trends 
described above represent a brain drain in the sense that the most educated members 
of South African Society are leaving. (Kaplan et aI, demonstrate that South Africa is 
experiencing a brain drain in the sense that South Africa has had a net loss in skilled 
individuals due to migration. The graph below shows the age of profile of self-
declared emigrants (Central Statistical Services): 
Self declared emigration by age 
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Figure 5 The above graph shows the age proftle of self declared emigrants. Source: Central 
Statistical Services. 
The graph shows a typical age/emigration profile. Emigration peaks in the early 30' s 
and drops off with the older age groups. Younger emigrants are less likely to report 
that they are emigrating therefore one would expect the true age profile to show a 
younger profile. 
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Reasons for emigration 
A study by Mattes and Richmond in Crush et al. (2000) surveyed currently employed 
skilled South Africans on their levels of dissatisfaction with South Africa and their 
expectations about life in the destination countries. These results are used as a starting 
point for the analysis and to analyze issues for which there is little alternative 
evidence. The methodology used will be discussed and then the main results of the 
survey will be discussed. 
Survey Methodology 
The survey reviewed a randomly selected representative sample of skilled South 
Africans. The definition of a skilled South African was: 
1. A South Africa citizen 
2. 20 years or older 
3. Who has matriculated and possesses a Technikon diploma or university degree 
4. Who is currently economically active. 
The AMPS survey was used to establish that the size of this skilled population in 
South Africa is 1.6 million. 4250 telephone calls were made to obtain a representative 
sample of 725 interviews. The results of the survey are discussed below. 
Survey results 
The survey covered a wide range of issues. The ones discussed here are: 
1. Friends and family overseas 
2. Steps taken to emigrate 
3. Sources of dissatisfaction in comparison to overseas 
Friends and family overseas 
Substantial past emigration from South African has lead to South Africans having 
extensive contacts overseas. Crush reports that 19% of skilled South Africans had a 
member of their immediate family overseas, 36% had a member of their extended 
family overseas, 59% had a close friend overseas, 40% knew co-workers who had 
emigrated and 57% knew someone in their profession that had emigrated. 27% of 
skilled South Africans are in contact with overseas professional organizations, and 7% 
are in contact with overseas recruitment agencies. Skilled South Africans main 
contact with overseas is through friends, acquaintances and family. 
Applicatiolls for Emigration documentation 
The number of skilled South Africans who are in the process of applying for overseas 
official documentation is a good measure of how many skilled South Africans are 
readying themselves to emigrate. The graph below shows the proportion of skilled 
South Africans who are applying for various sorts of documentation: 
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Percentage of skilled South Africans White and Black that have 
made concrete steps towards emigration 
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Work Permit in Permanent residency Foreign citizenship 
foreign country in another country 
0% of Whites 
.% of Blacks 
Figure 6 The proportion of skilled South Africans who have applied for foreign documentation 
by race group. Source (Mattes and Richmond. 2001) 
The graphs demonstrate that there is little difference between the proportion of skilled 
black and white South Africans emigrating. In numerical terms it implies that 
approximately 80 000 skilled South Africans are applying for work permits, 64 000 
are applying for permanent residency and 48000 are applying for foreign citizenship. 
These numbers are much larger than the actual number of skilled South Africans 
emigrating. This implies that a substantial proportion of South Africans who have 
applied to emigrate are not emigrating. Combined with the large numbers of foreign 
passport holders in South Africa these statistics suggest the possibility of a 
"emigration pool" who have applied to emigrate but do not actually do so. 
Sources of dissatisfaction 
The table below shows skilled South Africans' reasons for dissatisfaction with life in 
South Africa: 
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The graph shows the proportion of South Africans feeling dissatisfaction 
with the following aspects of life in South Africa 
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Figure 7 The graph above shows the proportion of South Africans that felt dissatisfied with the 
factors above. Source (Mattes and Richmond. 2001) 
The graph reflects high levels of dissatisfaction with many aspects oflife in South 
Africa. Concerns about the real value of incomes are picked up by concerns about 
cost ofliving. Other widely held reasons for dissatisfaction include safety and 
security. Concerns about taxation are paramount. This paper does not discuss the 
impact of taxation and expenditure. Firstly there are problems working out the 
incidence of expenditure or taxation. Due to this issue and length considerations this 
issue is not dealt with in this paper. 
The graph below shows how skilled South Africans regard conditions in the 
destination countries in comparison to South Africa. The graph shows the proportion 
of respondents who said that life was better overseas with regards to the following 
criteria. 
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Comparison between South Africa and destination 
countries. Proportion of respondents that said the following 
were better overseas 
Family safety 
I 
Personal safety 
I 
Upkeep of public amenities I 
I 
Customer serv;ces 
I 
availability of quality affordable products 
I 
I 
Le\el of taxation 
I 
Le\el of income 
I 
Medical serv;ces 
I 
Cost of li~ng I 
I 
Ability to find a good school for children I 
Job security 
I 
I 
Taxation I 
I 
Prospects of preffessional de\elopment I 
Job I I 
I 
Ability to find a desirable house J 
0 20 40 60 80 100 
Figure 8 The above graphs show the proportion of South Africans that felt the above factors 
were superior in the destination countries. Source (Mattes and Richmond. 2001) 
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Reasons for dissatisfaction with South Africa amongst skilled South Africans 
The survey showed that skilled South Africans were dissatisfied with a wide range of 
issues in South Africa. These can be roughly grouped into three categories. The first is 
safety and security concerns, the second is government expenditure and taxation and 
the third is real income issues and job prospects. For instance: 
);> 80% of skilled South Africans felt that they and their families would be safer 
and securer in the destination countries. 
);> 55% of skilled South Africans were dissatisfied with the future of their 
children in South Africa and 65% of skilled South Africans felt that their 
children's future would be superior overseas. 
);> 60% of skilled South Africans felt that incomes were higher overseas 
);> Over 60% of skilled South Africans were dissatisfied with the cost ofliving 
These issues will be discussed in greater depth in later chapters. The survey results 
provide justification for the theoretical and empirical approaches taken in this paper 
(Mattes and Richmond, 2000). 
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Chapter 2: Theoretical Chapter 
This chapter introduces the theory used in later chapters of the paper. It is divided into 
three sections: 
• Individual decision making 
• Family and group decision making 
• Fear and its impact on emigration 
The theory introduced in this chapter provides the basis for empirical discussions later 
in the paper. 
Section 1: Individual Decision making 
This paper uses the human capital approach. Sjaastad in his 1962 paper introduced the 
method of analyzing the migration decision as an investment decision (Sjaastad, 
1962). This was a departure from previous theory that analyzed migration as a 
response to differences in relative wage rates. The determinants of the decision can be 
represented by the equation below: 
(1) 
E stands for earnings in source country j and destination country k in time 1. C stands 
for costs in the source and destination countries. r stands for the migrants' discount 
rate. When the PV of emigrating is greater than zero the person will emigrate. 
The migrant invests in the costs of migrating in the hope of receiving a stream of 
benefits over his lifetime that provides a positive return to the costs. Sjaastad 
discussed a wide range of incentives and disincentives that the migrant faces. 
The costs of migration 
The costs of migration that Sjaastad discusses include the actual monetary outlay that 
is necessary to move as well as the opportunity cost of earnings foregone while the 
migrant moves and searches for a new job. There are also the psychological costs of 
leaving family, familiar surroundings and people. Traveling to visit family and friends 
can impose an additional cost of living in the new location. 
The benefits of migration 
The benefits of migration include an increase in the migrant's real earnings stream. 
This includes benefits from higher lifetime wages, changes in the cost of employment 
and benefits that the migrant receives in his role as consumer (through differences in 
the prices of goods that the migrant will consume). Furthermore the migrant faces a 
positive or negative benefit from his preference for his destination over his former 
residence. Finally there is the satisfaction or dissatisfaction that the migrant accrues in 
the process of traveling to his new place of residence. This dissatisfaction includes the 
dissatisfaction that results from being far away from friends and family (Sjaastad, 
1962). 
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This paper shows a few extensions to Sjaastad's paper. The sections discussed are: 
)i> The impact of real wages 
" The impact of unemployment on expected real wages 
);;> The impact of the exchange rate on the benefit from emigrating 
)i> The impact of uncertainty 
These will be discussed in tum. 
Real wages and the migration decision 
"Differences in net economic advantages, chiefly differences in wages are the main 
causes of migration" (Hicks, 1932). 
The expectation that a migrant will get a higher real wage in the destination country 
has been a powerful historical driver of international migration. It is widely argued 
that migration from Europe to the Americas was caused by higher real wages in the 
New World (Hatton and Williamson, 2001). 
The spending power of the mean real wage 
Differences in real wages continue to be the main explanatory variable in much 
empirical work on migration (for instance see Todaro (1969)). The migrant is 
interested in the goods and services that the real wage received in the destination 
location can purchase. When real wages are higher in destination countries this 
provides a powerful incentive to move to the destination country. The real wage is 
determined by the actual wage (and associated benefits) as well as the price ofthe 
goods and services that the migrant will expect to spend his money on. 
The impact of government taxation and expenditure on emigration 
In almost all countries government taxation and expenditure has a large impact on 
individuals' income levels. The impact of government on the migration decision can 
be neatly included into Sjaastad's description of the migration decision: 
(2) 
Where W stands for the before tax wage in countries k and j, T stands for the level of 
taxation and B stands for the level of benefits that the migrant expects to receive from 
the state in both countries. C stands for the costs of migration. 
The important differential for the migrant the difference between the level of taxation 
and the level of benefit received. Countries such as Sweden may have high levels of 
taxation but they also have high levels of government benefits. Whereas a country 
such as the United States may have low levels oftaxation but also lower levels of 
government benefits. 
Research on migration within Canada has shown that differences in levels of spending 
as well as the composition of government spending induce migration. Higher levels of 
24 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
C
pe
 To
wn
per capita spending on health and education were associated with higher levels of in 
migration. Levels of unemployment benefits also induced migration or retarded it 
(Day, 1992). Shaw found that fiscal variables were becoming more important in 
inducing internal Canadian migration in comparison with historically important 
variables sueh as wage rates (Shaw, 1986). 
Therefore an increase in the difference between taxation by the state and the benefits 
received from the state can be expected to induce emigration ceteris paribus. 
The impact of unemployment on expected real wages 
Unemployment impacts on the migrants' decision in two ways. Todaro (1969) 
discussed the impact of unemployment on the attractiveness of the labor market. 
Unemployment also impacts on the time it takes for the migrant to integrate or 
assimilate into the destination labor market. 
Todaro in his 1969 paper pointed out that the expected real wage for a migrant in an 
area needs to be adjusted for the likelihood of finding employment. This is necessary 
in order to provide a measure of the attractiveness of a given market. To take this into 
account Todaro suggested that the wage that the migrant expects in the destination 
country should be multiplied by the probability of finding employment to find out 
how attractive the labour market is (Todaro, 1969). 
(3) 
The symbols stand for the following: W (wages in the source and destination 
country), Pd (probability of finding employment in the destination country) and Ps 
(probability of finding employment in the source country). The rest of the symbols 
have the same meaning as in the equation described above. 
This equation compensates for the fact that areas with high real wages may also have 
high unemployment rates. For instance during the Great Depression when wages in 
the rural areas of the United States were lower than in the urban areas, high urban 
unemployment pushed workers from the urban to the rural areas. 
The time a migrant takes to find a job in the destination country is very important to 
the migration decision. Liquidity constrained migrants have to save in South Africa to 
finance this period of search in the destination countries. This initial cost of searching 
for a job could be taken as a once off cost for the migrant. 
When job applicants are abundant firms won't have an incentive to search for 
workers: workers have to seek out the firm. The firm only pays the cost of choosing 
between the workers "standing in a line" outside their door. When suitable job 
applicants are scarce the firm has an incentive to bear the cost of searching for 
workers. When firms are searching for employees the search cost for immigrants (and 
all prospective job seekers) in the destination country can drop to zero. In extreme 
cases where firms recruit in South Africa and pay relocation costs they bear the entire 
pecuniary costs of migration. In this case the costs of emigration for the migrant can 
fall below zero. Examples of firm based search include the direct recruitment of 
employees by Microsoft in South Africa and the opportunities for relocation provided 
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by international finns. Such finns explicitly use the attractiveness of relocation 
possibilities for potential migrants in their recruitment efforts. 
Thus tight labour markets are expected to be very attractive for migrants since the 
costs of emigration are lower. 
In summary unemployment enters into the migration decision in two ways. Firstly the 
expected attractiveness of the labour market as discussed by Todaro includes the 
probability of employment on an ongoing basis. Secondly unemployment impacts on 
the cost of searching for the first job in the destination country (Search theory is 
discussed in greater detail in the next section). 
The impact of the exchange rate on the benefit from emigrating 
While a weak currency clearly provides an incentive to the migrant to emigrate, it 
also makes it more expensive to emigrate. This is shown with the equation below: 
(4) 
PVemigration=the present value of emigrating (assumed to be a perpetuity), W d is the 
wage in the destination country, Ws is the wage earned in the source country, b ts is 
the proportion of income spent on tradable goods in the destination country, btd is the 
proportion of income spent on tradable goods, e is a measure of the weakness or 
strength of the currency in the source country (real exchange rate) and C is the cost of 
emigrating. 
If one solves for the cost of emigrating which makes the migrant indifferent between 
staying and going you get the following equation: 
If one assumes equal wages and that an equal proportion of income is spent on 
tradable and non tradable goods in the destination and source country. Furthennore if 
you assume that the cost of emigrating has to be paid for in the destination country, 
you get the equation below: 
(6) 
Solving for C* given values ofbt and e you get the graph below: 
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The benefit of emigrating given changes in the exchange rate and differences 
in consumer purchase of tradable and non tradable goods 
2.5 
The cost of 
emigrating, 
multiples of the 
wage rate in the 
destination county 
Strength of exchange rate from weak to 
strong from right to left 
Proportion of income spe t 
on tradable and non 
tradable goods, from 100 c 
spent non tradable aoods 
Figure 9 The above graph shows the cost of emigrating required to make the migrant 
indifferent between emigrating and staying. 
The graph essentially shows that the incentive to emigrate increases with a weakening 
exchange rate and a greater proportion of income spent on tradable goods. If the 
exchange rate weakens beyond this point the incentive to emigrate falls. This critical 
point beyond which a depreciation leads to a fall in the incentive to emigrate is 
discussed further below. 
The shape of the graph stems from the fact that the cost of emigrating increases 
exponentially with a depreciation, whereas the benefit of emigrating increases in a 
linear fashion. 
As the graph shows the incentive to emigrate increases with an weakening in the 
exchange rate as well as when the income spent on tradable goods increases. At the 
same time for when the exchange rate weakens past a certain point the incentive to 
emigrate falls. Thus once one includes the cost of emigrating into the migrants 
decision a weakening exchange rate has an ambiguous effect on the incentive to 
emigrate. It can either increase the incentive to emigrate or decrease it depending on 
how undervalued the real exchange rate is. 
The impact of assets on the incentive to emigrate 
When the migrant emigrates to take advantage of a stronger currency the migrant 
loses out on the value of savings. Assets such as property lose a substantial proportion 
of their value because they are less affected by changes in the exchange rate and are 
more akin to non-tradable than tradable goods. The loss on the spending power of 
savings and assets can provide a powerful disincentive to emigrate especially for older 
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people and those who have inherited wealth. This can be shown using a simpler 
version of the above equation. 
PVemigrating=-C/e+(W des-W SAe)/r+( eSSA-(SSA» (7) 
C is the cost of emigrating, e is the degree to which the source country currency is 
undervalued, r is the discount rate, S is the extent of savings of the migrant and W is 
the wage rate in source and destination countries. 
(8) 
Since the above function is concave3 the level of e beyond which depreciation drops 
the incentive to emigrate is described below: 
e* =«r(C+SsA»)/Ws)( 1/2) (9) 
The equation shows that an increase in the cost of emigrating C or an increase in 
savings S increases e*. Therefore an increase in the emigrants savings or the cost of 
emigrating increases the threshold real exchange rate at which a fall in the exchange 
rate decreases the incentive to emigrate. 
A decrease in (C+SSA)/WSA increases the level of e at which a depreciation increases 
the incentive to emigrate. Therefore people who expect to earn wages as opposed to 
live off savings will be more likely to emigrate as a result of a depreciation of the 
exchange rate. 
Therefore those with more of their wealth in human capital will have a greater 
incentive to emigrate than those with more of their wealth in assets. 
This leaves the effect of a depreciation in the currency ambiguous. While an 
depreciation will increase the incentive to emigrate for younger people and people 
with a greater proportion of their wealth in human capital it may decrease the 
incentive to emigrate for older people, and people with less of their wealth in human 
capital. 
While depreciation in the currency increases the value of wages earned in stronger 
currency countries it also increases the costs of emigrating. These costs can be felt 
through a fall in the value of assets as well as the actual cost of emigrating (including 
the cost of job search). 
The impact of risk and uncertainty on the incentive to emigrate 
Risk and uncertainty are important issues in a country such as South Africa. Many 
popular discussions of emigration have emphasized the impact of risks of different 
types on people's decision to emigrate. The impact of risk on the incentive to 
emigrate can be modeled two ways. 
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1. The first and more straightforward is to assume that during risky times future 
income streams in the riskier country are discounted at a higher rates and so 
valued less. 
2. The second is to model the cost of waiting as a function of uncertainty 
The first way is conceptually straightforward and fits neatly into Sjaastad's approach. 
The second is more complicated and follows from real option theory. This paper will 
provide a brief introduction to the second approach. 
A two period model that includes uncertainty 
For the most part this paper assumes that migrants have naIve expectations about the 
future. When they look forward to make the migration investment decision they 
assume that the future will continue in much the same vein as the present. This section 
uses a two period model to describe how migrants would react to uncertainty about 
the future (the framework, real option theory is not limited to such simple models). 
The theoretical discussion here will provide a brief introduction into the second 
approach that models the impact of uncertainty on the incentive to wait before 
emigrating. 
An irreversible decision 
This section assumes that migration involves an irreversible investment decision. 
While migrants can always return, the high non refundable costs of emigration, as 
well as the lack of return migration to South Africa, imply that describing the 
migration decision as irreversible is a reasonable description of many peoples 
experience. Once the migration decision is irreversible and can be delayed people 
need to work out when to invest in migrating. As shown below, it is often rational for 
people to delay the migration decision in period of uncertainty to avoid making a 
mistake. 
This model looks at the present value of investing in migration today, versus waiting 
for a year (or a defined period) to emigrate. The migrant expects that the incentive to 
emigrate will rise or fall in the next year (or next period). After that the incentive to 
emigrate will remain at that high or low level for perpetuity4 (Dixit and Pindyck, 
1994). 
4 Dixit and Pyndyk model investment using this model(Dixit and Pindyck, 1994) 
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Incentive to emigrate in the first period: 
If migration occurs in the first period the benefit from emigrating in the first period is 
simply a function of the cost of emigrating, the benefit from emigrating this year, and 
the probability of improvement or deterioration next year. If the migrant cannot wait a 
year the NPY of emigrating now is described below: 
NPV = • c + B + q .:. ...... ~ I.a IY:II ... ~ t~~ +.-... ~~... (to) 
The cost of emigrating: The once off cost of emigrating is made up ofthe Cost (C) of 
emigrating. 
The benefit from emigrating: The benefit of emigrating in the first year is B which is 
equivalent to [(EdO-EsO)-( CdO-CsO)], which is merely Sjaastads description of the 
emigration decision. 
The probability of a rise or fall o/the incentive to emigrate: The probability of the 
benefit from emigrating increasing is q, the probability of it falling (l-q). 
The extent of the/all or increase in the benefit (loss)from emigrating: The benefit 
from emigrating B, (EdO-EsO)-(CdO-CsO), increases by (l+u) with probability q, or falls 
by (I-d) with probability (l-q). 
The interest rate: The interest rate is denoted by r. 
Incentive to emigrate in the second year 
If the migrant waits till the next period, and then cannot delay, the NPY of emigrating 
is described by the equation below: 
NPVl=.-~ 
(t 1) 
.-~ ..... 
.. -------- , --
r 
This equation describes the incentive to emigrate if the migrant emigrates in the next 
year. Simplifying and subtracting the benefit from waiting is: 
LLl ..... ~+I!~ 
r 
r r 
(12) 
The value of emigrating is now the original value less the value of emigrating the next 
year. In other words if equation 3 is positive the migrant (?) rather wait till the next 
year to emigrate. Therefore the value of emigrating this year is: 
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NP:'.::A melllE'" ~ . ., i-~ LLJI ~~:~-... 
r 
(13) 
This equation merely includes the opportunity cost of emigrating now and not next 
year. 
Solving for B one can work out the regions in which the option has value and may be 
exercised in the second period. 
r 
Description Region Optimal investment 
rule 
Far out of 
the mone 
c r 
l+r+u+ru 
> B Never emigrate 
In the 
money cr 
l+r+u+ru 
Emigrate in period 1 
only if the benefit from 
emigrating increase~ 
Far into the 
money 
Always emigrate in 
eriod 0 
Table 1 This table shows the regions in which uncertainty impacts on the emigration decision 
Far out of the money: When the option has no value, the migrant will not emigrate 
because the emigration is too far out of the money, and will not break into 
profitability even if the value of benefit from emigrating increases in the next year. 
In the money: When the option is in the money uncertainty impacts on the decision to 
emigrate 
Far into the money: When the benefit from emigrating is very high in the first period 
(far into the money) the cost of missing out on a year in the destination country 
outweighs the value of waiting and so the emigrant will not delay the decision to 
emigrate 
Thus uncertainty only impacts on the migration decision when the option is in the 
money and not when it isfar into the money or when it isfar out of the money. 
Uncertainty when the option is in the money 
As discussed above uncertainty has the greatest impact when the migration decision is 
in the region described as in the money. Thus on can solve for the value of [(Edo-Eso)-
(CdO-CsO)] for which the migrant is indifferent between moving in the second period 
and moving in the first. This occurs when the migrant would emigrate if the benefit 
from emigration increased but not if it decreased. Thus equation (2) simplifies to: 
N P V 1 = q "'0 LIJ. r "'B_~ .1.l~~ 
r (14) 
Equating (5) and (1) and solving for B to find the point at which the migrant is 
indifferent between staying and going gives B*: 
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(15) 
Here B* gives us a measure of the value ofB required to make the migrant indifferent 
between staying and going. An increase in B* is an increase in the incentive to wait, 
whereas a fall causes a decrease in the incentive to wait (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). 
From equation (4) a number of conclusions can be drawn about optimal migration 
behavior under uncertainty: 
On(v good news matters5: Ceteris paribus good news in the source country would 
decrease the expected benefit from emigrating. Good news is shown by d, and it is the 
only variable to enter into the incentive to wait. Thus good news would delay 
emigration but bad news would not. The intuition of this is that the benefit from 
waiting comes from the ability to see if conditions in the source country improve. An 
increase in the benefit from emigrating does not increase the incentive to wait. 
Uncertainty increases the incentive to wait: If one sets q=d/(u+d), an increase in q has 
no impact on the value of equation (1) While a change in q has no impact on equation 
(1) it does change the variance in B. We can see the impact of changing the variables 
on the incentive to wait in equation (6 ). An increase in d with a constant q leads to an 
increase in B*, and so leads to an increase in the incentive to wait. Therefore an 
increase in the variation ceteris paribus leads to an increased incentive to wait. 
An increased probability of bad news decreases the incentive to wait: An increased 
probability of bad news (q) decreases the incentive to wait. Although q appears in 
both the numerator and the denominator its impact on the denominator is less than its 
impact on the numerator (since for most situations d is less than one). But since (l +u) 
does not appear in the equation it is not the extent of bad news (i.e. how bad things 
will get) but how likely they are to occur (q). 
Implications of the above for the analysis of emigration trends from South Africa 
Since (u), (d) and q are difficult to quantify it is difficult to test the above results 
econometrically (this is a general problem with real option theory). The above results 
through can be used to analyze trends in the underlying data. From the above 
discussion one would expect the following trends in the data on migration: 
• An increase in the amount of goods news about South Africa's future should 
decrease emigration as people wait to see if conditions improve. 
• An increase in mean preserving uncertainty in the future should decrease 
emigration 
• The more likely bad news the greater the incentive to emigrate in the first 
period. 
• The more into or out of the money the decision to emigrate becomes the less 
impact uncertainty will have on the emigration decision 
5 This reverses the standard result that only bad news matters. The reason is that bad news for 
emigration is good news for South Africa. So when good news happens less people emigrate, but this 
of course is a decrease in the value of emigrating! 
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• Bad news about the future of South Africa that increases (1 +u) without 
effecting q will not increase emigration 
Conclusions to risk and uncertainty 
Risk and uncertainty are both important to the emigration decision. Using real option 
model, one was able to come up with interesting insights into the impact of 
uncertainty on the emigration decision. 
Section 2: The effect of friends and family on the emigration decision 
The individuals' decision to emigrate 
This section has discussed the incentives that the individual has to emigrate. As will 
be shown in later sections this minimalist approach explains a large proportion of 
emigration from South Africa. 
The impact of friends and family 
This section discusses the impact on the incentives to emigrate of friends and family. 
Friends and family have a large impact on the incentives to emigrate. Friends and 
family increase the real value of income in the source country either directly or 
through the information they provide. Households made up of more than one person 
make up a substantial proportion of emigration from South Africa (84% for Australia, 
(Australian) Department of Migration and Multicultural affairs). Therefore family 
decision-making is important in either motivating or inhibiting emigration. 
Family decision making 
In his 1978 paper Mincer looked at migration as a decision made by the family rather 
than a decision made by a single individual. It is presumed that families are less 
mobile than individuals. Although some economies of scale are conceivable it seems 
that as a general trend the economies of scale that larger households experience in 
moving are outweighed by the diseconomies of scale. Demographic Research broadly 
supports this hypothesis and has shown that especially the presence of school age 
children inhibits migration (Mincer, 1978). 
In his analytical model Mincer abstracts from children and focuses on how the family 
migration decision is affected if one drops the assumption that one member ofthe 
household makes the migration decision. Mincer includes the presence of two 
members of the household. For convenience they could be a husband and a wife. H 
and Ware the returns to the husband and wife of migrating. Both Hand W include the 
full stream of costs and benefits from migrating including both monetary and non-
monetary costs and benefits. W + H F is the return to the family of migrating. The 
family migrates when F is greater than zero i.e. W+H is greater than O. If Hand W 
have the same sign then the presence of the marital partner has no impact on the 
migration decision of the spouse since they have a similarly positive incentive to 
move. IfF is positive and so the family calculus points to the family leaving but the 
signs ofH and Ware different then one member of the family would have stayed 
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except for the presence of the spouse. The result is a tied mover who migrates despite 
a private calculus that dictates that they should stay. IfF is negative but one family 
member would benefit from leaving the family member that would benefit from 
leaving is a tied stayer. The presence oftwo members in the migration decision 
potentially has a dramatic impact on the number of households that migrate. 
Mincer gives the example of a population in which 16% of the population have a 
private calculus that says they should migrate. If one randomly pairs members of that 
popUlation into couples one finds that less than 50% ofthe population that previously 
wanted to migrate still leave. If one relaxes the assumption of random pairing one 
finds that the migration decision for families is a function of a number of variables. 
Mincer mentions the following: 
When the gains and losses of husbands and wives are perfectly correlated the 
frequency of migration will not be changed by marital status. For instance in labour 
market terms spouses in the same field will have very similar employment 
opportunities from migrating. More importantly one could expect that husbands and 
wives preferences for the non-pecuniary aspects of the migration destination would be 
very similar, for instance husbands wives would be expected to have similar 
preferences for safety and security or climate. If the motivations for emigrating are 
largely non-pecuniary (for instance safety and security) the expected consensus on 
non-pecuniary benefits may well largely outweigh differences in labor market 
outcomes. Thus large non-pecuniary benefits from emigrating would decrease 
conflicts of interest between partners. 
Borjas (1993) extends Mincer's analysis to include the impact of children on the 
migration decision. However he abstracts from the importance of interaction between 
the husband and wife by assuming that there is only one parent. 
In the absence of children the decision to migrate is a function of relative returns to 
skill in the source country and the destination country as well as the costs of 
migration. When children are included into the analysis the parents need to predict the 
expected incomes of their children in the destination country as compared to their 
expected incomes in the source country. Since skills are assumed to determine income 
the parents need to predict the extent to which skills of the current generation are 
transferred to the next generation. In Borjas model skills are transmitted to the next 
generation according to Markov equations: 
v(source country) = a (source country) + s (source) v (source country previous period) 
+ e (source) 
Skills in the destination country are transmitted in line with the following equation: 
v(destination country) = a (destination country) + s (destination country) v 
(destination country previous period) + e (destination) 
Where v gives the skill variable for the person in each period, s represents the level of 
transfer of skills between generations, and e is a random variable that represents 
variation around the mean. s represents the degree to which a parents skills are 
correlated to the child's. a is a constant. Therefore s determines the extent to which a 
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society is 'open' or 'closed'. For instance a country such as the United States is 
regarded as being open which implies that children's ski1llevels are less correlated 
with that of their parents (i.e. that there is equality of opportunity) and therefore that 
the value of s is quite low. On the other hand s is large in countries in which it is 
difficult for children to succeed materially where their parents have not. 
First generation workers know that the wages of their children in the next period are 
described by the earnings distributions: 
Log W (source) m (source) + n (source).v (source country) 
Log W (destination) m (destination) + v (destination country) 
The differences between m in both countries are the result of the possibility that the 
source and destination country may have differences in expected economic growth or 
because assimilation possibilities could affect future earnings opportunities in the 
destination country. n stands for the price of skills in the source country. 
Using the above model one can make the following inferences. The attraction of the 
destination country for parents will in part be determined by the degree of openness of 
the source country. If the source country is closed (parents skills are strongly linked 
with their children's) and the destination country open (skills of children not linked to 
their parents), parents with high skills are less likely to migrate on behalf of their 
children. Therefore one would expect that only high skill parents from open countries 
would migrate to close countries. Low skill parents from closed economies are more 
likely to migrate on behalf of their children since their children have a greater chance 
of gaining skills in a more open economy than the destination country. Furthermore 
since the income of children is a function of economic growth parents will move on 
behalf of their children when they expect differences in economic growth between the 
destination and source country. When parents incorporate their children's welfare it is 
likely that they dramatically increase how far into the future they look. 
Tcha points out that the extent to which parents incorporate their children's earnings 
into their own migration decision is determined by the level of altruism that parents 
have for their children (Tcha, 1995). He highlights the possibility that parents may 
take a loss in terms of their expected income in order that their children may benefit 
from increased lifetime earnings or utility. An important implication of this is that 
parents may migrate at a far later stage in life than they may otherwise in order to 
improve their children's lifetime earnings or utility stream. This effect to some extent 
counteracts the age effects dampening of migration. 
The above theoretical discussions have a number of implications for patterns of 
migration. Since older migrants are more likely to be married (and so potentially be a 
tied stayer) this provides a reason that younger people would be more likely to 
emigrate. 
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The impact of friends and family on labour market success and attractiveness 
This section looks at the impact of friends and family on labor market success and the 
attractiveness of emigration. Friends and family decrease the costs of emigration and 
allow people to respond more easily to relative wage rates and standards ofliving. 
Friends and family also increase the standard of living for the emigrant. 
Friends and families impact on the liquidity of the labor market for the migrant 
Friends and family impact on the attractiveness of a labor market through the 
information they provide. This information makes the labour market more attractive 
and more liquid in the sense that the migrant gains access to more job opportunities. 
This section will use search theory to discuss the impact of friends and family on job 
market success. 
Nelson (1959) wrote the first influential paper on the importance of information on 
migration. He wrote his paper before the Stigler (1961) article on search. Before 
Nelson wrote his classic article in 1959 behavioral models of migration focused 
exclusively on the real income gains from migration. Nelson emphasized that the 
information that the migrant had about possible destinations was an important factor 
in the migration decision Nelson points out that family and friends that have 
previously migrated to a destination will be important sources of information about 
the location. Nelsons discussion can be extended with reference to search theory that 
was introduced by Stigler. 
Stigler argued that when information is a scarce resource, workers and firms would 
take part in a costly search for information about each other. He conceptualized a 
form of search where given a certain distribution of bids and a cost oftaking a sample 
workers would decide on the optimal sample size of job offers (Stigler 1961). 
Subsequent theoretical developments since Stigler have modelled the workers 
decision process as a sequential search for a new job where job offers have to either 
be accepted or rejected soon after they are made to the worker. This approach results 
in higher expected lifetime income for workers and also allows for numerous realistic 
complications such as shopping in real time and learning about the distribution of 
offers as a part of the shopping process (Mortensen, 1986). 
Thejob search process can be conceptualized as a two-sided bargaining game where 
the worker and the firm bargain over the surplus from the job by engaging in different 
levels of search. The side with the better outside option spends less time searching 
and so captures more of the surplus. 
Most of the time the firm will have a superior outside option and so will conduct less 
search. For the firm the type of search with the lowest cost is to find workers through 
references from their current employees. Holzer showed that for workers (either 
unemployed or not) searching for ajob through friends and family was the most cost 
effective method of job search (Holzer, 1988). This was found to be especially 
important when jobs where scarce. 
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The more demand for workers outstrips supply of workers the more one would expect 
that the firm would search for workers (Wial, 1991). In this case the firm would 
search for workers through advertising or working through a job bureau. To the extent 
that advertising is costly firms would be expected to restrict their advertising to areas 
in which they expect the highest return in the form of job applicants. In such a 
situation they could be expected to advertise closer to their location. 
Therefore one would expect that the impact of friends and family would be greatest 
on the job search process during periods when supply of workers outstrips demand 
such as during a recession. In labour markets characterized by excess supply such as 
the youth labour market, friends and family would be important for finding a job. 
For the migrant the presence of friends and family in the destination country is 
important because they improve the migrants ability to find a job. Thus an increase in 
friends and family in the destination labour market makes the labour market more 
attractive because it improves information flow to the migrant and so makes the 
destination labour market more liquid for the migrants (easier to find a job and move 
between jobs). 
One would expect friends and family to be especially important when migrants speak 
a different language to that spoken in the destination country. For most South 
Africans emigrating the destination countries speak a familiar language. Therefore the 
impact of friends and family on information flow would not be as dramatic as it 
would be if South Africans were immigrating to countries that spoke a different 
language. Obviously the choice of destination countries has much to do with the fact 
that they speak a familiar language. 
The impact of friends and family on job search provides a reason (other than pure 
discrimination) that migrants find it harder to find employment than locals. This effect 
noted for all OECD countries (OECD, 2000) but not always true for South African 
emigrants (Australian Department of Migration and Multicultural Affairs). 
As Nelson notes friends and family are important in a social sense. In an expanded 
definition ofthe migrants' real income these social benefits of friends and family 
would be included in a migrants real income. Friends and family in the destination 
country also lower the financial costs of emigrating. Corning to a conclusion about the 
relative importance to migration of families and friends as sources of real income and 
lower costs or as sources of information is very difficult (Nelson, 1959). 
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The implication of the above discussion is that the more migration into a destination 
the more likely will be further migration into the destination location. Greenwood, 
Nelson and others have tested this proposition and have found that past migration into 
a location is an important determinant of new migration into a location (Greenwood, 
1972). The emphasis of this discussion has been on the importance that friends and 
family in making emigrants more responsive to differences in labor market conditions 
than they would otherwise be. 
Conclusion 
This section has shown numerous ways in which friends and family impact on the 
incentive to emigrate. South African emigrants are leaving to societies with similar or 
familiar cultures and the same or familiar one. Thus you would not expect the friends 
and family effect to be as dramatic as it is when migrants are entering unfamiliar 
cultures with a different language. 
Section 3: The impact of fear and the emigration decision 
Of South Africans emigrating from South Africa 50% report in exit polls that they are 
leaving because of violent crime. Similarly Mattes and Richardson report that 82% of 
skilled South Africans are dissatisfied with levels of safety and security in South 
Africa and 90% feel that overseas countries are safer (Mattes and Richmond, 2000). 
While it is true that homicide rates increased dramatically during the early 1990's so 
have many other avoidable causes of death. Aids was a rare disease in 1990. Now, 
ten years later, it is expected to kill 15% of the South African population. Road 
accident death rates are comparably high. Why then is so much weight attached to 
fear of violent crime by those leaving South Africa? This section discusses the 
emotions to resolve such seeming paradoxes and gain insight into the relationship 
between crime and emigration. 
The analysis in this paper rests on what has been discovered about people's instinctive 
fear response (mostly in the last ten years). While emotions have been associated in 
the past in literature and ethics with "irrationality" and "unpredictability" the reverse 
is in fact true (Elster, 1998). Fear and the other basic emotions are predictable 
responses to the environment. This is in large part due to their distinctive nature 
discussed below. Therefore they result in behavior that is rational in the sense that 
they are consistent. The consistency of emotions makes them a powerful tool for 
analyzing economic problems in a framework that values models that are reliable 
across cultures and societies. 
Focusing on fear and ignoring the other emotions means that this paper does not 
provide "a fully specified model" in that emotional responses such as anger are not 
discussed. The reason for only focusing on fear is twofold. It is the best understood 
and most studied emotion which means that some of the essential results discussed 
here have not yet been extended to the other emotions. The second reason is that fear, 
especially of homicide is the most pertinent to emigration. 
This paper will argue that people are worried about violent crime and so would be 
expected to emigrate as a result because they are more sensitive to homicide than they 
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are to other causes of death. This sensitivity has a genetic and hence evolutionary 
basis6 . Since in the past those people with a genetic predisposition to expend special 
efforts to protect themselves from violent incidents were more likely to survive and 
have children than those that did not. Thus people emigrating for this reason are 
prepared to incur large financial and psychological costs to do so. While this aversion 
to violent death may (and probably does) have its basis in numerous complex systems 
in the brain this paper concentrates on the fear system. 
The next few sections look at the impact of genetics on the disutility (or discomfort) 
associated with violent experiences. The next section looks at people's perceptions of 
how likely they are to be affected by violence. 
Fear 
This section demonstrates that the fear reaction is to a certain extent, involuntary. This 
is shown for the first instant. 
People experience fear in response to threatening events or experiences. This fear 
response results in numerous bodily changes. People experience arousal which is the 
effect of the production of stress hormones gllluH.'ortIC(lI'j.., and adrenaline produced 
in the adrenal gland. LeDoux (2000) demonstrates that people experience bodily fear 
responses to threats even when they are not consciously aware of the threat in the 
cortex This subconscious fear reaction, processed by the amygdala, distinguishes 
between different types of threats. People who fear spiders will experience fear 
(arousal) when faced with a spider even though they are not consciously aware of the 
spider (Ohman, 2000). People who are conditioned in pavlovian type experiments to 
fear a particular threat react more strongly to those threats that man would have faced 
in his evolutionary environment than threats he did not face (Ohman, 2000). In 
addition the conditioning response to evolutionary type threats takes longer to 
dissipate. The fact that the fear response has its origin in sub-conscious awareness (the 
amygdala) as well as other evidence implies that this greater fear response has a 
genetic origin (Ohman, 2000). 
The evolutionary benefits of such instinctive fear responses are clear. Instinctive 
responses eliminate the need for learning and are quicker than a reasoned response. 
Man fears snakes, spiders and animals because these were threats that he could avoid 
in the evolutionary environment. Man has not developed instinctive fears to those 
threats that were unavoidable such as disease. 
It is likely that the greatest threat to survival that man faced in the evolutionary 
environment was homicide by man. While evidence on the causes of death in the 
evolutionary environment are scarce the evidence we have about hunter gatherer 
societies7 prior to colonial interference suggests that violence rates were 
6 Arguing that people have a genetic predisposition towards avoiding violence does not imply that 
everybody has such a predisposition. This predisposition is more developed in some people than in 
others. 
7 Hunter gatherer life in modem times provides the best available evidence of what the human 
experience was like in the evolutionary environment The evolutionary environment usually refers to 
pre-agricultural human society. Of course the evolution of mans brain can be traced back to the earliest 
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extraordinarily high. In hunter gatherer societies in the modem era (prior to 
colonization) homicide rates ranged from 40 per 100 000 for the !Xung Bushmen to 
360 per 100 000 for some tribes in New Guinea. Prior to colonization 60% of Eskimo 
males had killed fellow group members (Knauft, 1987). For comparison the Western 
Cape with one of the highest murder rates in the world has 60 per 100 000 murders a 
year, Colombia has 40 and the United States 10. Traditional agricultural communities 
in Africa as well as modem Western Europe Countries have murder rates ranging 
between 2 and 5 per 100 000. The high homicide rates in hunter gatherer societies 
suggest that homicide was a major cause of death in the evolutionary environment. 
The most detailed study that enables one to compare violent death with other potential 
causes of death in a hunter gatherer society was done by Knauft (1987) on the Gebusi, 
a hunter gatherer tribe in New Guinea. 
His results were that: 
• 33% of the Gebusi died of homicide 
• 2% died of accidents 
• 13% died of unknown eauses 
• 2% died of suicide 
• 51 % died of disease (Knauft, 1987) 
This detailed study of the Gebusi combined with the very high homicide rates found 
in most hunter gatherer societies strongly, implies that the most avoidable cause of 
death in the evolutionary environment was homicide. Thus one would expect that 
there would be a widespread and intense instinctive fear of violence in the human 
popUlation. In many of these societies homicide occurred unpredictably and was 
against the general flow ofHfe. In other respects these societies were highly peaceful8, 
Mans predisposition to be fearful of violence implies that an experience of violence, 
which may be entirely vicarious, will result in a high and sustained fear response. It 
seems likely that man would fear homicide more than any other threat because it was 
the greatest cause of death in hunter-gatherer society. 
The implication of this fear reaction for emigration are discussed in the following 
sections. 
The direct impact of fear 
Fear at its most basic level motivates action. It is well known to induce the flight, 
fight or freeze response. Fear of violence is no different. People who have 
experienced violent crime either directly or vicariously9 will be more motivated to 
take action than people who have not. Since the fear response to violence will be 
greater and longer lasting than from other threats to life, people will be highly 
mammals. This longer evolutionary history is less important for this paper since it only compares, 
accidents, disease and homicide. 
S These societies had no warfare and visible displays of aggression were frowned upon. Some of the 
societies had a strong ethic of sharing food and other essentials. 
9 The ability to recreate someone else's experience through a "virtual reality" type recreation of the 
event in ones owns mind is thought to be a defining characteristic of humanity (Whitehead, 200 I). 
Psychologically there is not difference between ones own experience and one that someone has directly 
experienced but describes to one. Thus people commonly experience post traumatic stress disorder as a 
result of other peoples experiences, even when the recounted experiences occurred in a previous 
generation. A phenomenon observed with the children of holocaust survivors. (Hamber, 1997). 
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motivated to emigrate, fight, or publicly protest in reaction to fear ofhomicide lO . Fear 
also focuses attention on threats in the environment, thus ensuring a greater ability to 
avoid such threats. Fear as a motivator and attention manipulator can increase utility 
since it facilitates collective and individual action to overcome or avoid the threat. 
Fear also leads to disutility. Anxiety and fear are uncomfortable emotions. In the 
extreme, fear leads to phobias and contributes to post traumatic stress disorder, both 
of which are debilitating. It also leads to depression, ill health and insomnia (Ohman, 
2000). Thus the impact of psychological injuries from violence are often more 
serious and sustained than physical injuries. ii 
Thus fear is both a benefit and a cost to the person experiencing the emotion. It 
motivates action but this increase in motivation comes at the expense of 
uncomfortable feelings and experiences. Thus people are more motivated and so more 
able to take the steps that are required to emigrate. At the same time people 
experience discomfort from living in a violent country such as South Africa which 
provides an incentive to emigrate. 
Fears impact on our people's subjective probability estimates of the likelihood of 
being affected by violence 
The probability that a particular individual will be directly or indirectly affected by 
violence is unknown. Furthermore since violence affects different people differently 
the potential effect of violence on a particular individual is also unknown. 
How do people compute the likelihood that they themselves will be subjected to 
violent crime and what the effect of that violence will be on them when they do not 
know the probability of this happening? According to Kahneman and Tversky, 1982 
they do this by trying to remember similar incidents 12. Because fear impacts on 
memory, it also affects the subjective assessment of the likelihood of being affected 
by violence. The memory retention ability ofthe hippocampus (a part of the brain that 
stores declarative memories) is accentuated by medium to low levels i3 of the stress 
hormones produced by the body's response to fear. Thus fear directly accentuates the 
creation of these declarative memories. This means that people remember fear 
inducing experiences far better than those that do not induce fear. Furthermore if a 
person who describes a frightening incident is visibly frightened the person listening 
will produce the hormones that facilitate the creation of declarative memories 14 
(LeDoux, 2000). 
10 It is telling that governments seldom run publicity campaigns persuading people to take action 
against violence whereas publicity campaigns for disease control and traffic safety are common. 
II This is especially true since the technology of medicine is better at curing physical injuries than 
mental ones 
12 This is called the availability heuristic and it is referred to widely in the psychological literature. That 
people work out uncertain events using the availability heuristic has been widely verified in countless 
experiments (Kahneman and Tversky, 1982). 
I.l At high levels of stress hormones (adrenaline and glucocorticoids) the functioning of the 
hippocampus is undermined to the extent that at sustained levels of these hormones the hippocampus is 
damaged. Thus the above discussion is limited to medium to low levels of fear. 
14 This occurs through the effect of frightened faces on the amygdala. Subconscious awareness ofa 
frightened face leads to arousal of the amygdala. It is very difficult to hide facial indications of 
emotions. Thus this etTect is genetically determined and thus involuntary (Le Doux, 2000). 
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Therefore people will have the clearest memories of those incidents which they found 
the most frightening, especially when the person who related his experience was also 
frightened and traumatized by the experience. 
Thus one would expect people, even those who are not in a permanent state of fear, to 
overrate the likelihood that a violent incident will affect them. Furthermore they will 
in all likelihood overestimate the effect (or disutility) such a violent incident would 
have on them and the people that matter to them. 
Random violence 
One intuitively expects that people would be more likely to emigrate due to random 
homicide rather than other more predictable types of homicide. The above discussion, 
as well as standard economic theory, supports this intuition. 
In economics it is commonly assumed that people are risk adverse. One would expect 
people to be risk averse towards violence for evolutionary reasons. In the evolutionary 
environment underestimating mortal threats was potentially deadly whereas 
overestimating them only resulted in the wastage of energyl5. Thus one would expect 
the expected disutility from more variable forms of violence to be greater than from 
less variable threats. 
Furthermore random violence which does not have defined place or time would be 
expected to induce more fear since there are fewer places and times free from 
danger I 6. The uncomfortable feelings of fear would be ever present, since the threat is 
ever present. 
Thus one can expect people to be highly concerned about a crime such as hijacking 
which has no fixed time or place (except in the car). Attacks in the home would 
induce anxiety because people spend a lot of time there. 
In conclusion random violence would be expected to result in more disutility for two 
related reason. Firstly risk adverse individuals would experience more disutility from 
random homicide. Secondly people will feel greater anxiety due to random homicide 
since its randomness means that there are more places and times in which it can occur. 
Violent crime versus property crime 
The crucial difference between property crime and violent crime is that violent crime 
is a far more emotional event which causes greater psychological damage. Therefore 
violent crime is less easily insurable and so cannot be effectively hedged by risk-
averse individuals. The above discussion as well as common sense implies that 
violence would lead to greater disutility than the loss of property. Thus violent 
property crime would not be feared due to the loss of property but rather due to its 
violence and the threat of death that this implies. 
15 Ohman argues that this is the evolutionary reason for Phobias and other such anxiety disorders 
(Ohman 2000). 
16 The Israelis use this effect when they deliberately assassinate suspected terrorists in the most obscure 
and unexpected ways possible. This leads to more disutility for terrorists up until their deaths and so 
increases their punishment. 
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Application ofthis discussion of fear to the theoretical discussions above 
Violence and other life threatening situations will result in fear. The experience of 
fear is an uncomfortable sensation and so threats to life result in a psychological cost. 
On the other hand fear motivates people to action. These two factor simultaneously 
impact on the migration decision. The next two sections integrate these two factors 
into the human capital approach for the individual and for family decision making. 
Impact of on the individuals incentive to emigrate 
Fear makes life uncomfortable as well as acting as a motivator. In the sense of an 
uncomfortable sensation fear of violence is easily integrated into the human capital 
framework. Fear of violence is a psychological cost that decreases the value ofliving 
in South Africa and so increases the incentive to emigrate. Fear as a motivation to 
take action enters the framework more subtly. One could conjecture that fear enters 
the decision making process in a number of ways: 
• Fear may make people less comfortable, more restive and therefore more 
responsive to their financial incentives. The intuition of this is that people 
who are fearful are less likely to enter into a "comfort zone" where they are 
unresponsive to opportunities for improved living standards that emigration 
offers. Thus fear lowers the psychological costs of emigrating that stem from 
"comfort" in the current location. 
• Fear may change peoples utility functions so that safety and security weigh 
more heavily in their utility function than previously. 
Thus fear at low levels as a motivator and as a psychological cost would increase the 
persons ability and desire to emigrate. At high levels fear is debilitating and may well 
inhibit emigration (see Hamber (1997)). 
Impact on group, family decision making 
The impact of fear on family and group decision making is more subtle than its 
impact on peoples individual incentive to emigrate. Fear of death impacts on the 
decision as a psychological cost and on people's motivation. 
In the Mincer model of husband and wife decision making it was aq,'lled that while 
one could expect a husband and wife to have different expected wages in the 
destination country, one could expect them to have similar views about the non-
pecuniary benefits/losses from emigrating. As discussed above fear automatically 
transfers from one person to another and so one would expect a husband and wife to 
have similar "fearful states" since they automatically "feel each others fear". Thus one 
would expect that a husband and wife to share levels of fear for biological reasons. 
This increases the likelihood that families or groups will emigrate since it increases 
the pecuniary benefits from emigrating in an inherently coordinated fashion. This 
effect works in two ways it increases the likelihood that everyone in the family or 
groups personal utility calculus will be in favor of emigration. Equivalently by 
decreasing the proportion of the incentive to emigrate that is made up of factors over 
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which there could be conflicting incentives, (such as wages), fear decreases the extent 
to which tied movers "lose" in relation to the gains for those who want to leave. 
For evolutionary reasons 17 (and common experience supports) parents are very 
protective of their children's safety and security. Thus one would expect that peoples' 
affection (or perhaps altruism) for each other to result in parents emigrating to protect 
their children, and partners emigrating out of a desire to protect each other from harm. 
Thus one would expect the altruism discussed by Tcha to be particularly intense with 
regards to safety and security. 
Thus fear of crime would act as a coordinating device facilitating group decision 
making. Since fear is experienced collectively the room for the conflicts of interest 
that often occur when actions need to be undertaken collectively are diminished or 
eliminated. 
Fear and the human capital framework 
Therefore fear can be integrated into the human capital framework. It is conjectured 
here, that fear of violence may well make people more responsive to their economic 
incentives. Since it lower the psychological costs of emigration, increases the desire to 
find out about alternative areas to live and decreases coordination problems. Fear of 
course could increase emigration because living in fear is uncomfortable. 
Conclusion 
Thus one would expect that a given level of homicide would lead to more emigration 
than other causes of death. One would expect more random and more variable sources 
of violence to cause more fear. Finally one would expect that it is the violent aspect of 
violent property crime that would lead to emigration. Incorporating fear of crime into 
the human capital approach is not straightforward since fear impacts on motivation 
not incentives. 
Section 4: Conclusion to Chapter 2 
The theoretical discussion has isolated a number of factors that are relevant to the 
migration decision. These factors are listed below and will be discussed in the 
sections that follow: 
., The real spending power of the wage 
., Unemployment 
., Taxes and benefits 
., The exchange rate 
., Risk and Uncertainty 
? Robbery and homicide 
? Family decision making 
? Friends 
17 This is an obvious implication ofthe expected natural selection ofpeopJe who protect their children 
from harm. The murder of children by jealous ex-partners "or husbands" was a large cause of homicide 
in some hunter gatherer societies (for instance the Xhoi). 
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The theoretical discussion provides the framework in which the empirical evidence is 
discussed. 
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Chapter 3 Restrictions on emigration 
This chapter looks at the institutional restrictions on immigration into the destination 
countries. This section concludes that: 
I. The institutional restrictions on emigration broadly mirror people's incentives 
2. These institutional restrictions were relaxed during the 1990's 
Australia, Canada and New Zealand 
Australia, Canada and New Zealand all use the points system in deciding whether or 
not to allow immigrants into the country. Since their systems are very similar this 
paper will discuss their migration policy in one section. The United Kingdom and 
United States do not use the points system although the UK is considering introducing 
it. 
Current criteria for immigration 
The points system provides points for family, skills, age, work experience, language 
and whether or not a job has been offered in the destination country. Points are also 
offered for investing capital and opening a business. People who have enough points 
to the enter the country are allowed to immigrate. 
The points system results in similar incentives to those already faced for financial 
reasons. It would seem that just as one would expect financially motivated migrants to 
maximise their human capital return, the points system destination countries set their 
criteria for immigration to ensure that they only let in migrants with high levels of 
future expected earnings. 
The points system in practise is less transparent than the above discussion implies. All 
destination countries allow immigration officials to reject or accept immigrants on the 
basis of unpublished criteria. 
The points system is aimed at allowing skilled immigrants in who have a good chance 
of success in the destination countries. The points system in many respects mirrors the 
incentives that migrants already face and that are described in the theoretical 
discussions above. 
The United Kingdom 
Criteria for immigration 
The United Kingdom has different criteria for different classes of people. It has 
different criteria for those who are eligible for UK or EU citizenship, for those with a 
parent who was a UK citizen, for those with a grandparent who was born in the UK 
and for someone who is a citizen of a Commonwealth country. 
European Union and UK passport holders 
It is estimated that 800 000 South Africans hold British passports. Many more are 
eligible through parents and grandparents (Van Rooyen, 2001). Furthermore many 
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South Africans hold European Union passports. South Africans who hold European 
Union (and obviously United Kingdom passports) are automatically granted work 
permits in the United Kingdom. For these people there are essentially no restrictions 
on migration or travel to the United Kingdom. In effect a substantial proportion of 
skilled South Africans face no institutional restrictions on emigration to the UK. 
South African~without a British Passport 
There are two main interrelated ways that South Africans who do not hold a European 
Union passport can emigrate to the UK. They can apply for a work permit or come 
into the country on a working holiday visa. Those South African citizens with a UK 
grandparent can apply for temporary visas or a four-year work permit. After tbur 
years of permanent residence, holders of such a work permit can apply for the 
permanent right to live in the United Kingdom (Grant of Settlement). 
United States 
Criteria for immigration 
The United States has the most complicated and least transparent immigration policy 
of all the destination countries. Migrants can enter America: 
lilegal(v: illegal immigrants are periodically granted amnesty by acts of congress 
Lottery: Green cards are granted through lottery 
Employer: Employers can sponsor migrants with special skills or talents. 
Fami~y: Most migrants are allowed in on the basis that they have family in the 
United States 
Traders and investors are allowed into the United States as well as refugees (mostly 
from countries with extensive experience of American involvement such as Vietnam). 
The overriding consideration in any application to the United States is the intent ofthe 
applicant. US authorities scrutinise and question visa applicants often at great length 
in order to determine whether the migrant is hiding a revealed intent. The United 
States immigration authority can refuse entry to migrants (or tourists) at any stage on 
the basis of unpublished criteria. This is presumably an attempt to stop terrorists and 
drug dealers from entering the United States (DECO, 2000) and (Van Rooyen, 2001). 
Of all the destination countries US immigration policy is the least focused on 
facilitating skilled immigration. Far more immigrants come in as refugees and 
through family connections than independently. Thus the US is a difficult destination 
to enter for South Africans without family connections to enter. 
Policy trends in the destination countries 
All the destination countries attempted to increase the number of skilled immigrants 
into their countries during the 1990s. They have done this while attempting to 
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decrease the number of family immigrants. The net result is that immigration figures 
are not an accurate measure of changes in the official position towards skilled 
immigration. 
Policy trends in point system countries 
The policy trends in the point system countries like their policies are broadly similar. 
All the points system countries have faced a shrinking pool of international 
immigrants while still having official policies that encourage immigration (Reitz, 
1998). 
Australia 
Australia implemented the points system for screening immigrants in 1973 (Reitz, 
1998). Immigration to Australia in the skilled and family entry class peaked in the late 
1980's. Since then family immigration has steadily fallen whereas skilled immigration 
has slowly increased during the 1990's (though not coming close to the levels reached 
in the late 1980's). Thus the Australian government has attempted to increase the 
number of skilled migrants while inhibiting immigration of family members. It has 
increased the quota of skilled immigrants by 5000 places and has implemented 
measures to facilitate the settlement in Australia of foreign graduates of Australian 
Universities. Australia is also extending its working holiday programme again in an 
attempt to increase skilled immigration. Thus while skilled migration may not be 
increasing dramatically, Australian immigration policy has been increasingly focused 
on facilitating skilled immigration (OECD, 2000). 
Canada 
Canada implemented the points system in 1967 as a way of increasing the skill level 
of immigrants (Reitz, 1998). Skill based immigration (called economic immigration in 
Canada) peaked in the mid 1990's but eollapsed dramatically in the late 1990's 
(probably as a result of the East Asian crises, a fact mentioned in chapter 2). Canadian 
family based immigration peaked in the mid 1990's. Similarly to Australia, Canada 
has attempted to restrict family based immigration and facilitate skilled-based 
immigration. Therefore like Australia while immigration has fallen during the late 
1990's this has been associated with an increasingly welcoming environment for 
skilled immigrants (OECD, 2000). 
New Zealand 
New Zealand implemented the points system in 1991, approximately 20 years after 
Australia and Canada (Statistics New Zealand, 2000). This lead to an increase in 
immigration to New Zealand during the early 1990's. New Zealand economic 
immigration peaked in the mid 1995 after which English language requirements were 
imposed on immigrants (a factor unlikely to impact on most South African 
emigrants). While immigration had fallen below 30 000 immigrants a year by the end 
of the 1990's the New Zealand's governments target for immigration has remained at 
38 000. Thus similar to Canada and Australia a fall in immigration to New Zealand 
has been associated with increasingly easy entrance for skilled and family based 
migrants (OECD, 2000). New Zealand citizens gain easier entrance into Australia (the 
48 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
position of automatic entrance changed in 2001). Since New Zealand citizenship is 
relatively easy to get there is the possibility that some immigration into New Zealand 
is motivated by the desire to enter Australia. 
While emigration to the points system countries fell in the second half of the 1990's 
this reflects a fall in the pool of potential immigrants. Immigration policy has been 
loosened in all the point's system countries in destination countries. 
Trends in United Kingdom immigration policy 
Britain started the 1990's with a hostile official position to immigration. This position 
has relaxed during the 1990's as southern England has been experiencing a tightening 
of the labour market and increasing skills shortages. Towards the end of the 1990's 
the UK had increasingly been implementing measures to facilitate further 
immigration. In line with this trend immigration to the United Kingdom has been 
growing. From 1995 to 1998 immigration increased from 320 to 401 thousand and 
working holiday visitors to the UK have increased from 23 200 in 1990 to 40 800 in 
1998. The make up of the immigrant flow has changed dramatically. Previously 
migration to the United Kingdom was heavily biased towards non-working migrants. 
During the late 1990's there has been a shift towards parity between working and non-
working migrants. This reflects a dramatic shift in the type of immigration. In May 
2000 the UK government announced a fast-track permit system would be introduced 
in order to speed up the recruitment of workers by firms that were experiencing skills 
shortages. Migrants could apply for a work permit on their own behalf instead of it 
being required that a firm apply on their behalf. The UK government was also 
implementing measures to make it easier for foreign graduates of UK Universities to 
stay on after graduation (OECD, 2000). 
The United Kingdom is opening its doors to skilled immigration. While the UK 
started the 1990's with policy hostile to immigration by the end of the 1990's it was 
increasingly moving towards the more "open door" policy that the points system 
countries use. 
Trends in immigration policy in the United States 
From 1992 to 1998 the number of employment-based visas into the United States 
increased from 54 thousand to 140 thousand. The family of the skilled migrant takes 
up a large number of these visas and so during the 1990' s only 5% of immigration 
into the United States was for employment purposes (as opposed to refugees and 
family based migrants). There has been increasing pressure to increase the number of 
H I-B visas for highly skilled workers. The annual quota of these visas has been 
increased from 115 to 200 thousand from 2000 to 2001 (OECD, 2000). Although 
family and refugees dominate immigration to the United States there have been 
increasing quotas for skilled and employment based immigrants. 
US migration has become increasingly aimed at allowing in skilled immigrants. It is 
still heavily weighted towards family immigration. 
49 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
n
Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that: 
1. Immigration policy is broadly in line with the incentives discussed in the 
theoretical chapters 
2. The destination countries were opening their borders to skilled immigrants 
during the 1990' s. 
Therefore the institutional requirements were facilitating increased emigration from 
South Africa during the 1990's. 
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Chapter 4 Quantative analysis of real income and political events 
This section develops an index or model reflecting the financial incentive to emigrate. 
The motivation for the index is fourfold. 
1. The lack of data makes econometric analysis difficult and the results 
sensitive'8. Given the expected and experienced problems with econometric 
analysis the index was created as a measure of the importance of financial 
incentives in the emigration decision. Thus the index provides a measure of 
the importance of financial incentives versus other causes such as violence. 
2. Secondly the index is used in combination with real options theory to analyze 
the impact of South African political uncertainty during the period under 
review. 
3. The third reason is that the index can be used to analyze factors such as the 
age profile of emigrants to certain countries and other implications ofthe 
theoretical section. 
This section is divided in to the following sections: 
• Outline of the index 
• Implications of the index for emigration rates 
• Sensitivity analysis on the index 
• Implications of the index for the age profile of emigrants and other issues 
• Impact of political uncertainty on emigration, using the index as a benchmark 
Use of average wages 
The model uses average manufacturing wages in its analysis. Although other 
measures could also have been used such as GOP per capita and GNI per capita 
wages, of which manufacturing wages are the most available, were thought to be the 
most appropriate for understanding skilled emigration. Using manufacturing wages 
implicitly excludes the return to productivity from the analysis. Return to productivity 
is discussed in Appendix I the discussion is inconclusive. 
Thc Human Capital Model 
The following model attempts to explicitly model the benefit or cost from emigration 
to the four most important destination countries, USA, New Zealand, Australia and 
the United Kingdom. The discussion is derived from the theoretical discussion. 
The incentive to emigrate due to wages is shown below: 
PV wages=L(Pd«(ed/Pd)xPdxW d)+ (,-Pd)( eXPsaxWd))/( 1 +rd)t-L(PSA« eSA/PsA)xW SA (,-
pSA)(esAxWsA))/(1 +rsAi... . ...... ( 16) 
18 The author has done extensive econometric testing using panel data methods. The only significant 
variable found was unemployment. Forty series from the World Bank and IMF data bases were tested. 
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Where: 
Pd and PSA are the proportion of wages spent on non-tradable goods in the destination 
country and South Africa 
(l-Pd) and (I-PsA) are the proportions spent on tradable goods for the destination 
country and South Africa 
W d and W SA is the wage expected to be earned in the destination country and South 
Africa 
Pd and psa are the probability of finding employment in the destination country. 
ed and eSA is the exchange rate in the destination country and South Africa where e = 
Dollar/Local currency 
P d and PSA are the price levels in South Africa and the destination country 
+r d and +rSA are the interest rates that migrants use to discount future wages 
t is the expected number of years that the migrant expects to continue working. 
The incentive to emigrate from the effect of emigration on the migrants stock of 
savings is shown below: 
( 17) 
Where: 
SSA is the stock of savings that the potential migrant has in South Africa 
The cost of searching in the destination country is shown below (including cost of 
searching in the destination country and the cost of not earning an income in South 
Africa): 
ts is the expected time it takes to find a job in the destination country 
8 is the fraction of the cost of the real wage that searching in the destination country 
costs 
The following equation is the present value of emigrating to the destination country: 
PVemigration=(2)Pd«ed/Pd)xW d)+ (,-Pd)(exWd»/( 1 +rd)t-L(PSA«eSA/PSA)XWSA (1-
PSA)( eSAxW SA»/( 1 +rsA)t)-«tsx(8W d»X( ed/P d»/( l-rsSS-(tsx(W SA»X( eSA/PSA)/( l-rsA)ts-
(SSAX« ed/P d»+(SSAX« esA/PSA» ...... (19) 
(Equation 19) is subject to the following condition: 
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(20) 
The right hand tenn is the cost of searching for a job in the destination country. This 
is assumed to be a function of the wage in the destination country. The left hand tenn 
is the value of South African savings in the destination countries. The migrant is 
assumed to be liquidity constrained. Since borrowing in South Africa to finance 
emigration is subject to substantial transaction costs this is not an unreasonable 
assumption. 
In the model below expected emigration from South Africa is worked out using the 
equation below: 
The present value of emigrating is worked out for all ages from 22 to 65. All positive 
present values are then added to work out the incentive to emigrate across all age 
groups. 
Expected emigration=Expected emigration(2JL:(~d« ed/Pd)x W d)+ (1-
~d)( exW d»/( 1 +rd/-I(~SA« eSA/PSA)xW SA (d3sA)( eSAxW sA»/( 1 +rSA)t)-
«tsx(oW d»x(ed/P d»/(l-rsSS-{tsx(W SA»X( eSA/PSA)/(l-rSA)ts-
(SSAX« ed/P d»+(SSAX{( esA/PSA» ...... (Equation 5) 
Subject to: 
(22) 
Excel fonnula 
The above equations are put into Excel to work out the PV of emigrating for migrants 
from the age of22 (the assumed beginning oftheir working life) to 65 (the assumed 
age of retirement). These PV amounts are then used to create an index of the financial 
incentives to emigrate. The assumptions made as well as the source of the data is 
shown below: 
Wages 
The migrant is assumed to expect to earn the average wage in the manufacturing 
sector in the destination country and South Africa. The figures used in the model are: 
• Manufacturing wages in the destination country (Annual). (Source, UNDP) 
• Manufacturing wages in SA, (Source, UNDP) 
Discounting of future earnings stream 
The migrant is assumed to discount future earnings streams by the real interest rate 
earned on government debt. The interest earned on government debt is taken since it 
is a measure (however incomplete) of financial markets' future expectation of 
government stability, and so provides a measure of the importance. The interest rate 
on government debt is taken from the IMF. 
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Savings rate in South Africa 
The migrant is assumed to save a constant proportion of wages. These savings are 
assumed to appreciate at the same rate as the real wage increases. Therefore this is a 
reasonable approximation for savings that are invested in non-tradable, durable goods 
that have high resale value. The typical example would be housing. People are 
assumed to save 20% of income. 
Proportion of income spent on imports 
The proportion of income spent on tradable and non-tradable goods is assumed to be a 
constant proportion of income and the same in both countries. Although one would 
expect some substitution given a change in the exchange rate this substitution effect is 
not included. The earnings spent on tradable goods are valued using a PPP measure 
and the earnings spent on tradable goods are valued using US Dollars. 
Exchange rate valuations 
Comparisons between the value of wages in South Africa and the destination country 
are worked out using international exchange rates and the World Bank Purchasing 
Power Parity measures. The purchasing power parity measures convert the currency 
into their value in the constant US dollars (1975). World bank Purchasing power 
measures are used. 
Expected chance of employment in South Africa and the destination country as well 
as the expected period of search 
The probability of employment in South Africa and the destination country is 
expected to be (l-(unemployment ratell 00». 
The expected time it takes to search for a job in the destination country 
It is assumed that there is a cost to searching for a job in the destination country. This 
cost is assumed to be a function of the level of wages in the destination country. Since 
wages are taken to be a good proxy for the cost of non-tradable goods such as housing 
and transport. The time it takes to find a job in the destination country is taken to be a 
function of the unemployment rate in the destination country. The higher the 
unemployment rate the longer it will take to find a job in the destination country. 
The explicit cost of emigration is assumed to be search costs in the destination 
country. These are assumed to be a function of the unemployment rate. In the index 
below job search is assumed to take the same percentage of a year as the 
unemployment rate (i.e. a 5% unemployment rate implies that 5% of a year will be 
sent searching). The emigrant gives wages that could have been earned in South 
Africa. 
There were problems finding data for New Zealand unemployment before 1985. This 
means that the financial incentive index can only go back to 1985 for New Zealand. 
The time series used for South Africa did not have data after 1997. Unemployment for 
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these two years were extrapolated from previous years data. The method is shown in 
Appendix 2. The data was from WEF A. 
Migrants are assumed to be liquidity constrained so that if at the beginning of the year 
they do not have enough money to support themselves for the required for job search 
in the destination country they have to wait another year to save up more money. 
Many countries make it a requirement to get a visa that the migrant takes enough 
money to support job search. 
Weighting of different variables 
Different variables into the model can be weighted using weightings. Weightings are 
included in the model so that the model can be calibrated and it allows the relative 
importance of different variables to be evaluated through a sensitivity analysis. 
The model was initially calibrated at 30% of income spent on tradable goods and 70% 
spent on non-tradable goods. Furthennore the interest rate is weighted at 10%. As 
shown in the sensitivity analysis these weightings achieve the best fit. 
In an ordinary least squares model the weightings of the different variables are 
inherently worked out by solving the equations l9 • This index uses a similar technique 
except the weightings are worked out through a sensitivity analysis. 
The weightings allow one to strip out certain aspects of the index and so simplify it. 
For instance the index includes a period of search in the destination country. The 
weightings allow one to remove this period of search and see how it affects the 
behavior of the index. In this way one is able to evaluate the importance of every 
aspect of the model to the index's fit with the series. 
Output from the excel model 
The Excel fonnulas work out the present value of immigrating into the destination 
countries for all ages from 22 to 65. This output from 1975 to 1999 for all ages is 
shown below. 
JQ Econometric results proved to be highly sensitive and in cases seemingly spurious. Fixed and 
Random effects models were used. 
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ruput d model for all ages fran 1975 to 1999 
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Figure 10 The graph shows the incentive to emigrate from South Africa to the UK at all ages 
from 22 to 65 covering the period from 1975 to 1999 in 1975 US Dollar (PPP) 
The graph below shows the incentive to emigrate in 1999 from 22 to 65 for the UK. 
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Figure 11 The graph shows the initial period in which migrants need to save money in order to 
emigrate (in this case a year) as well as the cost of emigrating at older ages. It also shows that the 
incentive to emigrate is greater for younger workers. 
Emigration index 
The emigration index is worked out by adding all the present values of emigrating for 
all ages from 22 to 65. Thus it works out the balance of incentives across all ages. 
Figure 12 shows all the values if positive and negative values are used. Figure 13 
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shows the value of the index if only positive incentives to emigrate are summed. 
Using positive present values makes more economic sense. People are not expected to 
emigrate in response to negative financial incentives. Therefore only positive 
financial incentives should result in emigration. Thus by adding positive financial 
incentives one models the financial incentives that one expects people to be 
responding to and emigrating as a result of. By ignoring the negative incentives one is 
taking out financial disincentives that would not be causing emigration in the first 
place. 
Figure 14 shows the sum of all incentives to emigrate including both positive and 
negative returns form emigrating. 
Emigration Index to the United Kingdom from South Africa 
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Figure 12 The graph above shows that emigration index that includes both positive and negative 
present values, becomes positive in the late 1980's. 
Figure 15 shows the summed positive incentives to emigrate. 
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Index of the incentive to emigrate using summed positive 
present values from emigrating 
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Figure 13 The graph above shows the summed present values from emigrating. Similarly to the 
above graph it only results in a positive value in the late 1980's. 
The two versions of the index result in similar trends. Both show a large increase in 
the incentive to emigrate after the late 1980's. The analysis below uses the second 
measure. 
Section 2: Using the index to predict emigration 
The index below is used to predict emigration from South Africa for four of the major 
destination countries, the UK, USA, New Zealand and Australia. 
Australia 
Figure 16 shows the incentive to emigrate to Australia (solid line) and emigration to 
Australia from South Africa (dotted line). The left axis shows emigration numbers, 
the right the financial incentive to emigrate. 
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fErn igration from Australia and the Index of the incentive to em igrat~j 
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Figure 14 The graph above shows the incentive index to emigrate to Australia (on the right axis) 
and actual emigration to Australia (left hand axis) have a similar trend. 
The graph strongly suggests a close relationship between the incentive to emigrate to 
Australia and levels of emigration. 
United Kingdom 
Figure 17 shows the incentive to emigrate to the UK (solid line) and actual emigration 
to the UK (dotted line). 
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Figure 15 The graph shows that there was a relatively close relationship between the incentive to 
emigrate to the UK and actual emigration to the UK. 
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The graph shows a similarly strong relationship between the emigration index and 
actual emigration. Interestingly emigration to the UK continued during the late 1990's 
despite a fall in the incentive to emigrate 
New Zealand 
Figure 18 shows the incentive to emigrate index to New Zealand. The incentive to 
emigrate is the solid line whereas actual emigration to New Zealand is shown with a 
dotted line. 
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Figure 16 The graph shows a reasonably strong relationship between the incentive to emigrate to 
New Zealand and actual emigration. 
The graph shows a stronger relationship between emigration and the incentive to 
emigrate during the 1990's than during the 1980's. The sharp increase in emigration 
to New Zealand that followed the dramatic increase in the incentive to emigrate 
coincided with the relaxing of emigration controls. So while South Africans seem to 
have been responding to their incentives, the lowering of emigration controls allowed 
South Africans to take advantage of these incentives in a way that they could not due 
during the 1980's. Emigration to New Zealand changes in the incentive to emigrate by 
one year. 
United States of America 
The graph below shows emigration to the United States (the solid line) and the 
incentive to emigrate index (dotted line). 
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Emigration to the United States and the Index of the incentive to emigrate 
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Figure 17 The above graph shows the incentive to emigrate index (left hand axis) and actual 
emigration to the United States (right hand axis). The graph shows emigration leading the 
incentive to emigrate by one year up until 1997. 
The link between the incentives to emigrate to the USA and actual emigration to the 
USA is the weakest of all the countries. While emigration to the USA seems to be 
leading the incentive to emigrate (this may be due to different reporting periods for 
the USA INS and the World Bank), emigration to the USA drops dramatically in the 
late 1990's whereas the incentive to emigrate rises. The generally weak relationship 
between USA emigration and the incentive to emigrate may well be related to the 
USA's obscure and inconsistent immigration rules. Thus while the USA is the most 
favored emigration destination (Mattes and Richmond, 2000) it is the second smallest 
destination country for South African emigrants. 
The impact of financial incentives to emigrate 
The figures above show that emigration to the destination countries seems to have 
strongly followed the index of the incentive to emigrate to these countries .. The 
following patterns are notable: 
• Emigration to the most important destination countries the UK and Australia 
followed the index closely 
• Emigration to New Zealand followed the incentive to emigrate more closely 
after the relaxation of immigration restrictions 
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• Emigration to the USA seems to be an anomaly, emigration leads the incentive 
to emigrate and emigration dropped dramatically to the USA during the late 
1990's. This was a period in which emigration to the other destination 
countries was increasing and the incentive to emigrate was increasing. 
The next section does sensitivity analysis to determine which aspects ofthe model are 
determining the close fit noted above between the incentive to emigrate and actual 
emigration. 
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Section 3: Sensitivity analysis 
This section does a sensitivity analysis on the index to detennine what aspects of the 
model are driving the model. Only the model for the UK and Australia are tested. The 
aspects of the index tested are: 
1. the impact of interest rates 
2. the impact of savings 
3. the impact of the upfront search costs in the destination country 
4. wage rates 
5. unemployment rates 
6. the impact ofthe proportion of income spent on tradable goods 
These aspects are analyzed in tum. 
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The impact of interest rates 
Interest rates are tested from a 100% weighting down to a 0% weighting. A 0% 
weighting eliminates interest rates from the model. Figure 20 shows how this impacts 
on the index. 
Sensitivity test on interest rates im pact on the index (A ustralia) 
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Figure 18 The graph shows the impact of changing the weight on interest rates in the index 
The graph show that an interest weighting of 100% decreases the fit of the model. 
While a weighting of 0% seems to fit less well than a weighting of 10% they are both 
a close fit to the emigration series. Figure 21 shows the same procedure for the UK 
series. 
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The im pact of interest rates on the index to the UK 
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Figure 19 This graph shows the impact of the index of changing interest rates for the index to the 
UK 
The results for the UK series are very similar to those for the Australian series. A 
weighting of 100% eliminates of the fit with the index with emigration. A weighting 
of 10% improves the fit only slightly over a weighting of 0%. 
Impact of interest rates on the index 
Interest rates are not driving the model. If one weights the interest rate at 0% and so 
eliminates interest rates from the model the index still has a reasonable fit with the 
migration series. Although a low weighting which is greater than zero does increase 
the indexes fit with the migration series a 100% weighting eliminates this fit. 
This does not imply that migrants do not use a discount factor but rather that they are 
as responsive to the yield on government debt as the model would imply. 
The impact of savings on the index 
Savings have a slight impact on the index. At low weightings on savings the model 
calculates that people cannot afford to emigrate (and so they have to spend more years 
saving). This effect is small. Higher levels of savings merely decrease the incentive to 
emigrate. This effect is due to the impact of the weakness of the South African Rand. 
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Therefore an increase in the weightings on savings has almost no impact on the trend 
in the index. 
The impact of the upfront search costs in the destination country 
The period of search has little impact on the trend of the index. Changing the 
weighting on the search costs merely changes the level of the index without changing 
its trend. Therefore the period of search has almost on impact of the trend. 
The impact of unemployment on the index 
The graphs below show the impact of changing the weighting on unemployment on 
the fit of the model. Figure 22 shows the impact on the index for Australia: 
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Figure 20 The graph shows the impact of changes in the weightings on unemployment one the 
index 
Figure 22 shows that increasing the weighting on unemployment decreases the fit of 
the index with emigration. Therefore increasing the impact of unemployment 6 times 
causes the index fit to dramatically deteriorate. On the other hand eliminating 
unemployment from the index decreases the fit with emigration slightly mainly during 
the early 1980s and mid 1990's. Figure 23 shows the impact of changing the 
weighting on unemployment on the index to the UK: 
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Changes in the index given changes in the weighting on unem ploym ent 
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Figure 21 The above graph shows the impact on the UK index of changing the weighting on 
unemployment 
The graph shows a trend to the Australian index. If unemployment is highly weighted 
the index loses its fit with the emigration series. If the unemployment is eliminated 
from the series there is a still a strong fit but the index fit is less close than it was 
previously. 
The impact o(unemployment on the index to emigrate 
The analysis suggests that the main driver of the model is wages not unemployment. 
Including unemployment in the model does improve the index fit with emigration. 
This is in line with (Fallon and Lucas, 1998) who argue that skilled unemployment 
was minimal in the early 1990's. While there is no reason to believe that skilled 
unemployment was a serious issue before then, there is evidence that skilled 
unemployment has increased over the late 1990' s. This issue is discussed in greater 
detail in the next chapter. 
The impact of the weightings on wages converted into dollars versus the weighting on 
the wage converted into purchasing power dollars 
The above analysis assumes that 30% of income is valued in dollars and 70% valued 
in purchasing power parity terms. This section measures the impact of this assumption 
on the fit of the index with emigration rates. Figure 24 shows the impact of changing 
these weightings on the index to Australia: 
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This graph shows the impact of changing the weighting on wages valued in dollars or purchasing power parity 
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Figure 22 The above graph shows the impact of changing the weighting on doUar versus 
purchasing power parity measures on the index for Australia 
The graph shows that increasing the weighting on dollar wages decreases the fit of the 
index. On the other hand taking dollar wages out of the index takes the index to zero 
for the whole period under before 1992, a period in which there was substantial 
emigration. Therefore the combination of the purchasing power measure and the 
dollar denominated measure create the best fit. Figure 25 repeats the procedure for the 
UK. 
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1m pact of different weightings on tradable and non tradable goods on the Index for the UK 
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Figure 23 The graph above shows the impact on the index to the UK of changing the weighting 
on wages denominated in dollars versus purchasing power parity 
The graph shows that again similarly to Australia dollar denominated wages do not 
provide a good fit with the series on emigration. Again completely weighting wages 
takes away the incentive to emigrate before the mid 1990's. Again with the UK 
weighting both dollar and purchasing power parity result in the best fit with 
emigration to the UK. 
The impact on dollar earnings versus purchasing power parity earnings 
The graphs above suggest that wage differentials in purchasing power parity terms 
drive the fit between the index and actual emigration. Without some weighting on 
dollar denominated earnings the index would be in the red for the whole of the 1980's 
and early 1990's. Therefore some combination of the two effects seems to be driving 
emigration. 
Results o(the sensitivity study 
The sensitivity analysis has suggested the following: 
• Wages, especially when valued in purchasing power terms are the driver of 
the index's fit with emigration 
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• Unemployment and interest rates improve the fit of the index but are 
dispensable 
• Savings and the period of search have no impact on the fit ofthe model 
Therefore the sensitivity analysis suggest that the higher purchasing power of wage 
rates in the destination countries is the primary cause of trends in emigration from 
South Africa. 
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Section 4: Implications of the model for age/emigration profile 
Since the model explicitly models the relationships between incentives to emigrate 
and the age ofthe migrant it can be used in qualitative analysis of the age profile of 
emigrants. The impact of the exchange rate on short-term emigration to the UK is 
shown. 
Short-tenn emigration to the UK 
With the increase in the number of South Africans going on working holidays there 
has been discussion on the possibility that these South Africans will return to South 
Africa after a period of one or two years overseas. People have suggested that 
emigrants have a financial incentive to go to the UK and then return to spend to South 
Africa to spend their UK generated savings. Obviously these savings are worth far 
more in South Africa due to the weak exchange rate. While one would expect people 
to have a non-pecuniary incentives to return, such as the lure of family, friends and 
familiar places the argument made here is that they do not have afinancial incentive 
to return. 
Figure 26 explores the migrant's incentives. The graph shows the incentive to migrate 
from SA to UK (top line at younger ages) and then it also shows the incentive to 
emigrate back from the UK to SA (higher line at older ages). 
Present value of emigration from SA to UK and from UK to 
SA 
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Figure 24 The graph shows a faUing present value to emigrate to the UK and an increasing 
present value from emigrating back from the UK to SA. 
The graph shows the increasing incentive to return to SA with age due to the benefit 
from the increased value in savings. Since this incentive increases till retirement there 
seems no reason why South Africans should return till they retire. The longer the 
migrant takes to return to South Africa the higher their payoff. In other words a 
migrant with a purely financially detennined utility function will maximize utility by 
emigrating to the UK at the earliest possible time and return to SA at the latest 
possible time. In fact as the graph above shows an emigrant that returns to SA makes 
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a substantial loss from doing so. This result is supported by the graph below that 
shows the relationship between emigration to the UK and return migration back to SA 
by South African citizens. 
Emigration and return migration from SA to the UK 
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Figure 25 The graph shows emigration from SA to UK and from the UK to SA. Little 
relationship between the trends is evident. 
The graph shows no clear relationship between emigration to the UK and return 
migration back to South Africa. This supports the suggestion of the model that 
emigrants to the UK would not return in the short term since they have an incentive to 
put off return migration till they are older. As people spend longer in the UK, one 
would expect the attraction of home, and friends and family in SA to decrease as they 
form new friendships, create families and familiarize themselves with their 
surroundings. Therefore one would expect that with time in the UK the financial 
incentive to delay return migration would increasingly outweigh the non pecuniary 
incentives. 
As the migrant settles into life in the UK factors such as friends and family would 
increasingly provide an incentive to stay in the UK and not return to South Africa. 
This raises the interesting possibility that migrants will never in fact return20 . 
20 One intuitively expects friends, family and surroundings to become more important as people get 
older. Thus one would not expect people to return in their old age. 
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Section 5: The impact of politics on uncertainty during the 1980's and 1990's 
This section provides a brief description of the expected impact of political 
uncertainty on emigration from South Africa from 1980 to 1990. It uses real option 
theory to analyze the impact of a series of political events on emigration from South 
Africa. Real option theory incorporates uncertainty about the future into the human 
capital framework. In this framework migrants decide whether or not to emigrate 
based on their current incentives as well as their expectations about the future. When 
migrants are in the money they would emigrate but they are worried that they will 
make an essentially irreversible mistake, so they may delay their decision. 
This section uses this framework to make predications about the impact of political 
events on emigration rates. Two preliminary issues are discussed. The first is the 
number of people who are in the money at anyone time. The second is the impact of 
political uncertainty in the past. 
The number of South Africans who are in the money 
The number of people who could emigrate but do not because they are worried about 
the future could be an insignificant number making the impact of real option theory 
minimal. We can proxy how large this group is through the widely noted phenomena 
that government threats or attempts to restrict emigration, increase emigration. A 
likely reason for this phenomenon is that people would emigrate but for the value they 
place on waiting. Governments threats to impose taxes decrease the value of waiting 
or take the value of waiting away (by prohibiting emigration or restricting it). Thus 
people's reactions to government threats to restrict emigration can be taken as a 
measure of the number of people who are in the money, i.e. would emigrate but are 
waiting to see if conditions improve. In the case of South Africa 6% of skilled South 
Africans said that government attempts to restrict emigration would hasten their exit 
(Mattes and Richmond, 2000). The implication being that 90 000 South Africans in 
1999 were in the money. This is a large enough group of people to impact on trends in 
emigration. 
The impact of political events on emigration over the last 50 years 
Changes in political risk has played a significant role in emigration over the last 60 
years, as the graph below shows. An index of political uncertainty for South Africa 
over the last 30 years is shown below with levels of self reported emigration: 
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Figure 26 The above graph shows self reported emigration combined with a political risk index. 
Source (Fedderke et ai, 2001) 
Figure 28 strongly suggests that there was a strong correlation between certain periods 
of political risk and emigration. Political risk though has declined in the 1990's while 
destination countries report that emigration has been increasing. Reasons for this 
include the limits of the political risk index as well some reasons brought out by the 
discussion below. 
Real option theory and political uncertainty 
As discussed in the theoretical section the main values in the real option model of 
emigration are not directly observable. Therefore this section discusses how these 
variables would be expected to change over the period. This section emphasizes on 
uncertainty in South Africa since politics in the destination countries is stable enough 
to be ignored. 
The equation below is taken from the theoretical discussion. 
B' = -~n-~-E-+-:I:."~ (equation 6 from the theoretical 
discussion on uncertainty (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994». 
The symbols are discussed in greater depth in the theoretical discussion. 
B* gives us a measure of the value ofB (benefit from emigrating) required to make 
the migrant indifferent between staying and going 
q is the probability of an increase in B in the next period 
(l-q) is the probability of a decrease in B (improvement in SA conditions) 
(I-d) is the extent of a decrease in B Therefore a fall in (I-d) implies an improvement 
in South Africa. An increase in (I-d) implies a deterioration in South Africa. 
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Year Event Im12act on 9 and d (see Im12act on emigration 
theoretical section) 
1984 Township uprising The probability of Speed up emigration 
violent revolution 
increased (increase in q) 
1985 Township uprisings continue These events increased Resulted in speeding up 
Rubicon speech and debt the value of (I-d), of emigration 
repudiation. increased the value of q 
Imposition of the state of emergency 
1986 Township uprising Further increase in q Further speed up of 
emigration 
End of FW gives reform speech. Increase in value of Slow down emigration 
1989- Release of ANC leaders, Unbanning improvement in SA, fall as future may improve 
1990 of the ANC. Cesation of the armed in the value of (I-d), and 
struggle increase in probability of 
improvement (l-q) 
1992 Referendum endorses Fall in expectations of Increased delay in 
white revolution, so a emigration decisions 
fall in (I-d), combined 
with a fall in probability 
of deterioration (fall in 
q) 
1992- Increasing political violence, ANC Increase in expectation A acceleration in 
1994 followers killed at Boiphatong, of a violent future, an emigration decisions 
international recognition of political increase in q. Increase in 
violence (I-d) 
1994 Peaceful Election and success of A fall in (I-d) Dramatic delay in 
sporting teams (1995). Policy of (expectations of an emigration 
reconciliation. The start of the end improvement in SA), fall 
of the IFP/ANC war. in q as 1994 ended many 
peoples worries about 
emigration 
1996- End of Government of national Increase in (I-d), Acceleration of 
1999 unity. increase in (I-q), fall in emigration as optimism 
Adoption of constitution uncertainty ends and uncertainty 
about the future 
decreases 
Table 2 Political events that would have impacted on expectations of the future Source 
(Waldmeir, 1997) 
This brief analysis implies the following: 
Period A: a speeding up of emigration from 1984-1986 
Period B: a slowdown from 1989 to 1992 
Period C: speeding up from 1992 to 1994 
Period 0: a slowdown between 1994-1996 
Period E: an acceleration after 1996 
Evidence for this will be discussed in relation to the graphs showing the incentive to 
emigrate to the UK and Australia. 
Evidence for Australia. 
Figure 29 again shows the incentive to emigrate to Australia (dotted line) and 
emigration to Australia from South Africa (solid line). 
75 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
To
wn
rE ~ ;grati~nir~~ A u-~-;~~Iia; n d th-e -;~ d ~ x oi-th~~i-nc:nt~v_~to_e mig ra-t~-l 
6000 3200000 
A B C D E 
5000 -
-' 
-2800000 
, 
, 
, 
, 
4000 , , 2400000 
, 
, 
, 
, 
, 
,-, 
-2000000 , , 3000 
, 
2000 1600000 
1000 1200000 
o -r-'--r-'~--r-+-.--.-,-,L-'-~-r~-.~~,-,--+-800000 
80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 
l-------- ------- -------- -------- ---- - - -------------------------- ---j --INCENTIVE INDEX TO AUSTRALIA -----EMIGRATION TO AUSTRALIA 
- -------------------- -- -- -- ------ - ---------- - - --------------- ----------------------- ------
Figure 27 The graph above shows the incentive index to emigrate to Australia and actual 
emigration to Australia have a similar trend. 
Period A: (an acceleration in emigration expected) The graph shows that as expected 
from 1984 to 1986 emigration to Australia increased. 
Period B:( a slowdown from 1989 to 1992) The graph shows that as expected 
emigration slowed down from 1990 to 1992. 
Period C: (speeding up from 1992 to 1994) The graph shows an increase in 
emigration. But this coincided with a large increase in the incentive to emigrate. 
Period D: (a slowdown between 1994-1996), Again the graph shows a slowdown in 
the increase in the emigration rate, but again this coincided with a decrease in the 
incentive to emigrate. 
Period E: (an acceleration in emigration) Despite the slowdown in the increase in the 
incentive to emigrate, emigration during the period increased. It seems unlikely that a 
fall in uncertainty caused this dramatic rise after 1996. 
Emigration to Australia was strongly effected by political uncertainty during the mid 
1980's. During the rest of the period emigration seems to predominantly following 
financial incentives. 
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The United Kingdom 
Em igration to the UK and the index of the incentive to em igrate to the UK 
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Figure 28 The graph shows that there was a relatively close relationship between the incentive to 
emigrate to the UK and actual emigration to the UK.. 
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Figure 29 This graph shows permanent emigration to the UK (granted after a minimum of fours 
in the UK). While providing a rough measure of emigration rates it shows no increase in 
emigration to the UK during the 1980's. 
Period A: (an accelerationfrom 1984 to 1986) From the Grant of Settlement data 
emigration to the UK did not increase during the 1980's. 
Period B:( a slowdown from 1989 to 1992) The graph shows that as expected 
emigration slowed down from 1989 to 1992. Despite an increased financial incentive 
to emgirate. 
Period C: (speeding up from 1992 to 1994) The graph shows an increase in 
emigration. But this coincided with a mild increase in the incentive to emigrate. 
Period D: (a slowdown between 1994-1996), Again the graph shows a dramatic fall in 
the emigration rate to its lowest level over the period. While this did coincide with a 
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Period A: (an acceleration from 1984 to 1986) Emigration to New Zealand increased 
during the period, despite falls in the financial incentive to emigrate to New Zealand. 
Period B:( a slowdownfrom 1989 to 1992) The graph shows that as expected 
emigration increased very mildly during the period despite a dramatic increase in the 
incentive to emigrate. Strict immigration requirement may well have dampened 
emigration during this period. 
Period C: (speeding upfrom 1992 to 1994) The graph shows an increase in 
emigration. This coincided with a massive increase in the incentive to emigrate and a 
lowering of immigration controls into New Zealand. 
Period D: (a slowdown between 1994-1996), The graph shows a fall in the emigration 
during the period. This coincided with an increase in the incentive to emigrate. 
Period E: (an acceleration in emigration) Emigration mildly declined during the 
period. This follows a decline in the financial incentive to emigrate. 
The table shows that emigration to New Zealand broadly followed expectations. The 
exception being period E in which emigration declined when an acceleration was 
expected. 
United States 
Figure 33 shows emigration to the United States. 
Em igration to the United States and the Index of the incentive to em igrate 
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Figure 31 Emigration to the United States 
Period B:( a slowdown from 1989 to 1992) The graph shows that contrary to 
expectation emigration to the United States increased during the period. 
Period C: (speeding up from 1992 to 1994) The graph shows that again contrary to 
expectations emigration increased. 
Period D: (a slowdown between 1994-1996), The graph shows a rise in emigration 
during the period .. 
Period E: (an acceleration in emigration) Emigration declined dramatically during 
the period. 
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As the table notes, political events seem to have little consistent impact on emigration 
to the USA. Therefore emigration trends to the USA remain an enigma. The most 
likely explanation is the opaqueness of USA immigration policy. USA immigration 
policy is highly weighted towards family immigration which is probably less 
responsive to financial incentives and political events. 
Emigration and political events 
Table 3 shows the period in which emigration reacted as expected to political events. 
The table shows periods in which emigration reacted as expected to politics but not to 
financial incentives. These periods are called POLITICS, and the cells are colored 
white. The periods in which emigration reacted as expected to the financial incentives 
but not as expected to politics are called FINANCIAL, and the cell is again colored 
white. The periods in which both politics and financial correctly expected emigration 
to move in a certain direction are called BOTH and the cells are colored light grey. 
Periods in which both political incentives and financial incentives correctly predicted 
that emigration would move in a certain direction but one effect seems more likely to 
be correct are called BOTH/(POLITICS OR FINANCIAL) depending on which effect 
seems to have been greater, and the cells are colored darker grey. Periods in which 
neither financial incentives nor political events correctly predicted the direction of 
emigration are called NEITHER and colored black. 
This table shows whether emigration to the countries was In line with expectations, 
given the political events of the time and In line with the expectations of the financial 
model 
Australia New Zealand 
POLITICS nfa 
NEITHER 
NEITHER 
FINANCIAL 
Table 3 Causes of emigration, political versus financial factors (1980-2000) 
The table shows that emigration reacted as expected in most cases. Politics seems to have been 
more important in the 1980's and early 1990's. 
The table shows the emigration seems to have reacted more to politics during the 
1980's and early 1990's. Towards the end of the 1990's financial incentives seem to 
have become more important to emigration. The USA is notable for the complete lack 
of success of politics or financial incentives to predict emigration. 
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Political events and emigration to Australia and the UK 
This section has shown the importance of political events to emigration to Australia, 
and the UK. Politics seems to have had different impacts on emigration to certain 
countries at different times. The following period are notable: 
Mid 1980 's: For instancc during the 1980's political events lead to a dramatic 
increase in emigration to Australia and no impact on emigration to the UK. 
Early 1990's to mid 1990 's: During this period the roles reversed. Australia shows the 
least reaction to political events, the UK is the most sensitive. 
This inconsistency can partly be explained by changes in immigration policy as 
mentioned above. A more theoretical reason comes from Real option theory. 
Mid 1980 's: During the mid 1980's the UK was far out of the money (see Figure 14 
and 15 for an indication). Therefore political events did not push people into 
emigrating there. Australia on the other hand was into the money and so emigration to 
Australia spiked as peoples expectations about the future in South Africa fell causing 
people accelerate their emigration decision and so go. 
Mid to early 1990 's: During this period emigration to the UK was further into the 
money. Therefore emigration to the UK was highly responsive to emigration. On the 
other hand Australia was too far into the money for uncertainty to impact on the 
emigration decision. Therefore emigration to Australia showed little response to 
political uncertainty during the period. 
The incentive to emigrate to the UK was higher than it was for Australia for the 
1990's. Furthermore emigration rates to the UK are for the most part higher than they 
are to Australia. Australia is the preferred destination over the UK for employed 
skilled South Africans (measured by Mattes and Richmond). Thus while the UK 
maybe far further into the money for some such as the recently graduated, for the 
skilled and employed, Australia is further into the money than the UK. This would 
make sense given Australia's similarity to South Africa and weaker exchange rate. 
Thus for the group immigrating into Australia, Australia was further into the money 
than the UK was for the group emigrating there. 
Real option theory 
This discussion has showed that real option theory can be used to gain interesting 
insights into emigration from South Africa. While the validity of real option theory is 
not tested here (it seldom is econometrically) its ability to help the analyst explain 
migration behavior is demonstrated. 
Conclusion to Chapter 4 
This chapter has shown the following: 
1. Real wages are the main cause of trends in emigration but that unemployment 
may also have contributed during the period. 
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2. Political events have played a large role in emigration. This effect has 
occurred around the trend determined by financial incentives 
3. Immigration restrictions have played an important role in restricting 
emigration in the past especially for the USA and for New Zealand 
Neither the index nor political events provide an adequate explanation for the 
dramatic increase in emigration during the late 1990's. The next chapter presents a 
range of factors that could have increased emigration during the late 1990' s. 
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Chapter 5 Alternative explanations for emigration during the late 1990s 
The above analysis did not adequately explain the dramatic increase in emigration 
during the late 1990's, whereas other periods were reasonable well explained. This 
points to the possibility that during the late 1990's new factors started to impact on 
emigration. This chapter outlines a range of factors that could have increased 
emigration during the late 1990's. While it was government policy to redistribute 
income during the late 1990' s quantifying the impact of this is very difficult and this 
was left out of this section (Nattras and Seekings, 2001). This is an important area of 
future research. The chapter is divided into two sections: 
Section I: outlines the possible impact of unemployment on emigration. 
Section 2: outlines the impact of crime and violence on emigration. 
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Employment, unemployment and migration in South Africa 
The theoretical section suggested that unemployment could be a major cause of 
emigration. But Fallon and Lucas demonstrate that during the early 1990's 
unemployment amongst the skilled in South Africa was low (Fallon and Lucas, 1998). 
The conclusion could be drawn that unemployment is therefore not a driver of 
emigration from South Africa. This is supported by the above analysis that showed 
that unemployment was of secondary importance to emigration over the period 1980 
to 2000. This section presents evidence that skilled unemployment increased during 
the late 1990's. Fortunately for this period there is detailed information for South 
African unemployment across different categories of workers. It will then discuss a 
World Bank study which at first glance implies that the skilled labor market is very 
tight. 
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Figure 32 The above graph shows the unemployment rates for aU types of South Africans. 
(Source, October Household Survey) 
The graph shows an increase in unemployment for all racial groups, education levels 
and both sexes 
The graph below shows that South African unemployment increased dramatically 
whereas most of the destination countries experienced dramatic falls in 
unemployment during the late 1990's. 
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Canparison d increase or decrease in unemployment for South Africa and 
destintion COUltries from 1995 to 1999 (indexed on 1995) 
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o South Mica tertiary 
unemplo~ent 
[J South Mica matric 
unemplo~ent 
o New Zealand - Prices, Production, 
Labor - Unemplo~ent Rate (%) 
• Canada Unemplo~ent Rate 
o PtJstralia Unemplo~ent 
o United States Unemplo~ent 
rI United Kingdom Unemplo~ent 
Rate 
Figure 33 The graph above shows the proportionate increase in unemployment from 1995 to 
1999 (Source October Household Survey and the WDI). 
The above graphs show a dramatic increase in unemployment across all race groups, 
education levels and sexes. In the destination countries in this period there was a 
dramatic fall in unemployment. 
Shortage of Skilled workers? 
The above results suggest that unemployment rates across all races and education 
levels have been increasing in South Africa. A World Bank paper "Constraints to 
Growth and Employment in South Africa" (Chandra et ai, 2001) seemingly 
contradicts these findings. It found an acute shortage of high skilled workers amongst 
large and small firms. Of large firms 82% had acute problems finding skilled 
employees such as managers and professionals and similarly amongst small firms 30-
45% struggled to find skilled workers. In other words the very skills that Kaplan et al. 
(1999) found emigrants possessed (Chapter 1) were the skills that firms are having 
trouble finding. 
Combined with the World Bank study this suggests that unemployment is unlikely to 
be a reason motivating emigration since the skilled labour market tight in South 
Africa. The World Bank survey provides the probable answer to this paradox. 
75% of firms preferred to hire workers with relevant work experience whereas only 
15% of firms preferred to hire workers with tertiary education. Human resource 
managers rated tertiary educated workers without experience as only weakly 
employable. On the other hand only 30-40% of large firms and only 10-20% of small 
firms undertook training. This is despite 82% of large firms reporting a shortage of 
skills and 30-45% of small firms reporting a shortage of skills. 
Therefore the reason for the skills shortage seems to be unwillingness on the side of 
employers to hire without the relevant work experience or to train them. For the 
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possible reasons for this are discussed below. The result of this is a very rigid labour 
market where there is little capacity for workers to acquire needed skills required by 
the market. This leads to unemployment and so emigration. 
Therefore the skills shortage does not demonstrate that unemployment is 
inconsequential for tertiary educated South Africans. 
Conclusion on employment and unemployment 
In conclusion unemployment in South Africa for all education levels and all racial 
groups has increased in the last five years of the 1990's. This needs to be contrasted 
with falls in unemployment in the destination countries. Therefore 54% of skilled 
South Africans are correct to in their view that job prospects are superior overseas 
(Mattes and Richmond, 2000) and (Chapter 1). Increases in unemployment in all 
likelihood fall more heavily on the young. Furthermore the young that do not have 
experience are regarded as only weakly employable despite tertiary education. 
Therefore it is possible that the young emigrate to receive necessary work experience 
to enable them to work in South Africa (none the less, as discussed earlier, evidence 
suggests that they are not returning). These trends in unemployment and employment 
would provide a powerful incentive for South Africans to migrate to the destination 
countries. 
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Section 2: Comparison between crime and violence in South African and the 
destination countries 
This section explores differences in crime and violence between South Africa and the 
destination countries. Crime surveys and some police statistics show that South Africa 
has higher property and violent crime rates than the destination countries but 
comparable crime rates to similar developing countries21 (Louw et al. 1998), (Human 
Development report, 2000). This paper will show that while on many crime categories 
South Africa has comparable levels of crime to other countries, South African crime 
is coloured by very high rates of homicide. As discussed above one, would expect 
from a biological perspective that the threat of death would massively amplify the 
distastefulness and fear endangered by any criminal act. Thus one can concentrate on 
both the level of crime as well as the expected chance of death experienced by 
victims. The first section will place South African crime rates and the nature of South 
African crime in an international context. This section shows that South African crime 
is uniquely high and violent. The second section briefly compares crime in SA with 
crime in the UK and Australia. The third section discusses trends in South African 
crime since the early 1990's. 
21 Measuring crime is fraught with similar measurement problems to migration. Crime is measured 
though crime reported to the police (useful for more serious crime and time series data) and victim 
surveys (more accurate especially for less serious crimes but not as many years are available or 
countries). The data discussed in this paper refer to police reports or surveys depending on availability 
and expected accuracy. 
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Murder in South Africa compared to the destination countries 
South Africa has high levels of murder. In Johannesburg 10% of whites, 10% of 
Asians and 70% of blacks report that someone in their family was murdered in the last 
four years22 (Louw et al. 1998). Victim surveys in the destination countries do not 
even ask about murder. The graph below shows that homicide rates in SA are high 
compared to the destination countries. 
International comparison of Homicide Rates 
Western Cape ~===============~:-TiiiiiiTiii-l Gauteng KwaZulu-N tal
Northern Cape 
Eastern Cape 
RSA 
Free State 
North West 
Brazil 
Mpurralanga 
1II.s:: Noli/hern A-ovince 
.~ ~ lij fl N.lreland 
'E en .g .~ United States 
S -g ::( e Is rael 
o IU Q. Canada 
-~ 
• ~ 
Australia ~ 
New Zealand • 
England Wales • 
ireland +- --+---+----+----+----+----+----+----i 
o 10 20 u.20 .. d 40 50 
.-.urnici e rafe per 60 70 80 
100000 
Figure 34 Murder rates per 100 000 for South Africa and homicide (includes manslaughter) for 
the destination countries. Source (FBI Uniform Crime Reports) and South African police 
services. 
Clearly homicide is far higher in South Africa than it is in the destination countries. 
Within South Africa violent crime is highest amongst middle income earners 
(Shoenteich et al. 2001) (Louw et al. 1998) but there are no statistics specifically 
measuring homicide rates amongst the educated population. Working out how many 
homicides occur in the skilled population is difficult since the police do not release 
the areas that police stations cover (nor do they release figures from before 1994, a 
problem for times series). Given this restraint a rough estimate of murder rates in 
areas with a high proportion of educated people can be worked OUr3. Using a method 
described in the appendix the average homicide rate per 100 000 people was worked 
out for 23 highly educated areas. The average homicide rate per 100 000 was 61.4. 
This is slightly above the national average for South Africa but far higher than the 
23 The workings for these numbers are contained in the appendix. 
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murder rate in the destination countries. This figure is 30 times that found in UK, 
Australia, Canada and New Zealand and 6 times the homicide rate in the USA. 
In Johannesburg 60% of murders are committed by strangers compared to 10% in 
Australia and 20% in the UK (Louw, 1998) (AIC, 2001) and (Patsy, 1999). One 
would assume that the proportion of stranger murders is higher for the educated since 
they are more at risk of property crime (as will be discussed later). Given this even if 
one assumes that 60% of homicides on the educated are by strangers nationally, then 
the stranger homicide rate for the educated in South Africa is 36 per 100 000. This 
rate is 100 times the stranger homicide rate in Australia and 128 times the stranger 
homicide rate in the UK24. In these countries only a tiny proportion of homicides are 
by strangers (lOa year in Australia). 
In conclusion homicide in South Africa for both the educated and uneducated is far 
higher than in the destination countries. In particular homicide by strangers is 
estimated to be a massive 100 to 130 times higher in South Africa than it is in the UK 
and Australia. Since stranger homicide is expected to be the most random form of 
homicide it wi1l result in the greatest disutility. Furthermore the resulting fear would 
provide an impetuous to action that would result in high levels of emigration. 
Robbery and violent theft 
Thirty percent of residents of the suburbs had experienced a robbery or mugging in 
the last three years in Johannesburg. In Cape Town 13% of residents had been robbed 
or mugged in the previous three years. In the UK this figure was 3%. Property crime 
is higher in wealthy areas (Brown, 200 I) as well falling disproportionately on the 
wealthy (Schonteich et aI, 200t). Violent crime is highest in the 48000 to 96 000 
income brackets (Schonteich et aI, 2001). Thus the well educated are 
disproportionately affected by robbery and burglary. 
24 Homicide rates in educated areas in SA and in the UK and Australia have mildly declined since 
1996. The number of homicides in the educated areas has declined from 448 to 415 from 1996 to 2000. 
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The graph below compares South African violent robbery rate with Australia and 
other countries: 
Number of robberies and violent thefts recorded per 100 000 of the population, 1998 
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Figure 35 Number of robberies and violent thefts and robberies per 100000 of the population 
(police reports), 1998, Table taken from (Masuku, 2001) 
The graph shows that while South Africa has the highest number of robberies and 
violent thefts its rates are comparable to some European countries as well as some 
destination countries. The difference is that in Australia few robberies end in 
homicide. Only 10% of murders occur in conjunction with other crimes (most 
homicides are by friends and family). In South Africa on the other hand murder is 
highly correlated with the number of robberies and thefts (and general level of 
crime )25. Thus robberies in South Africa are far more likely to result in death. 
Historical crime trends in South Africa 
Migration has accelerated during the 1990's (Chapter 1); if crime was a cause of this 
trend one would it expect to have been increasing as well. Crime levels in South 
Africa did start to increase in the late 1980's and accelerated in the early 1990's. 
Murder increased from approximately 8000 in 1987 to approximately 18 000 by 
199326 (Luiz, 2001). But unlike migration rates, murder rates levelled off in the late 
1990's and in fact experienced a mild decline generally and in the educated areas. The 
number of violent robberies though increased from 40 to 56 000 during the late 
1990's (and from 2795 to 4284 in the educated areas discussed above). Murder and 
robbery rates have been in decline in the destination countries over the 1990's but 
these rates are so low when compared to South Africa that they are unlikely to be a 
factor in emigration. 
The theoretical overview discussed previously provides three possible reasons that a 
sudden increase murder rates in the early 1990's followed by a stable yet high murder 
rate in the late 1990's would result in an increase in emigration over the whole period. 
25 John Luiz shows this using time series from 1960 to 1993 (Luiz, 200 I) 
26 Crime rates from before 1994 are not released by the police services so figures are read off a graph. 
Crime levels before 1994 do not include crime in the homelands and so are not comparable with post 
1994 levels. 
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People directly impacted on by violence may well take time before they leave. They 
may need time to recover from the trauma (Hamber et aI, 1997), furthermore since a 
violent incident occurs unexpectedly people may take longer to leave because they are 
less well prepared for emigration in terms of emigration papers and so on. Thus 
peo~le directly struck by violence would probably only emigrate with a substantial 
lag2 .leading to emigration rates increasing long after violence rates have stabilized. 
Peoples available (easily remembered) incidences of murder will be increasing long 
after murder rates have stabilised as they hear about more and more people who have 
been killed. Thus their subjective probability estimates of being a victim of homicide 
will also be increasing28 • 
Thirdly and more subtly peDple instinctively feel the emotion of fear experienced by 
others since people feel fear in response to the fearful faces of others. In a family and 
amongst friends this means that if one member becomes fearful the whole !:,YfoUp feels 
fear (to a greater or lesser extent). Thus the whole group is motivated by a commonly 
experienced fear to take some action29 , As the experience of homicide spread through 
the population it would increase fear in the population and thus motivate increasingly 
large groups of people to emigrate because homicide overcomes the disparate 
economic incentives found in any heterogonous group of people. 
Thus stable homicide rates during the late 1990's could be consistent with 
acceleration in emigration during this same period. One would expect that if current 
trends continue, homicide would playa decreasing role in peoples incentive to 
emigrate as peoples subjective probability estimates and levels of fear fall into line 
with the high yet stable homicide rate. 
Migration and fear of homicide 
South Africa has a level of stranger murder that is at least an order of magnitude 
greater than the destination countries, probably a hundred times greater. The result is 
that skilled living in South Africa have a powerful incentive to emigrate and are given 
the motivation to do so by fear. Although murder rates have not been increasing 
during the late 1990's the theory of violence means that the dramatic increase in the 
early 1990's would take time to feed into people level of fear and their subjective 
probability estimates. Thus stable murder rates could quite easily be a factor in an 
accelerating emigration rate during the late 1990's. The govemmeneo does not release 
crime statistics from before 1994 and so one can not do time series econometrics to 
27 One would not expect the same lag with economic or political events because they occur far more 
slowly than violent events. Political and economic events give emigrants far more time to prepare to 
emigrate than violence does. 
28 This assumes that memories fade at a slower rate than the new instances of homicide are heard about. 
29 In a society with little voice (such as SA) emigration may be the cheapest action that any group of 
people can take and so the only obvious response to the experience of homicide. Some may doubt that 
SA has little voice but the government's hostile reaction to democratic action against criminal violence 
such as protests and pleas for the reintroduction of the death penalty imply that the cost of changing 
government policy is very high. A case in point is the government's reaction to a Portuguese 
community march in Pretoria. In this case the governments reaction was so hostile the Portuguese 
government intervened to avert a government backlash against the Portuguese community in SA. 
30 The police information service is very helpful when providing post 1994 statistics, though these 
statistics are only provided by police station level from 1996. 
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measure the impact of homicide on emigration. At the same time the indirect way that 
people come up with their estimates of crime levels means that these figures may not 
be related to people's perceptions about the actual level of homicide. 
Conclusion to Chapter 5 
This chapter showed that a range of factors could have caused the dramatic increase in 
emigration in the late 1990's, These include stable yet high homicide rates during the 
late 1990's, an across the board increase in unemployment. 
Age profile (~f emigrants 
This discussion has provided evidence that violence and unemployment probably 
effect different age groups. 
It is likely that violence affects older people's emigration more, since homicide is 
related to property crime. Furthermore many older people will have experience that is 
highly demanded on the job market. Therefore they are unlikely, as a whole, to 
emigrate as a result of unemployment. 
Younger people on the other hand have less property and so are less likely to be 
effected by homicide. Furthermore they are more likely to be unemployed since they 
are less likely to have the experience that employers find so important to hiring 
decisions. Therefore younger emigrants are more likely to emigrate due to 
unemployment than violence. 
The emphasis on violence by other authors in thefield 
This analysis provides an indication, why violence is argued to be the main cause of 
emigration by authors such as Van Rooyen (Van Rooyen, 2001). Since violence 
impacts on older emigrants, analysis that relies largely on anecdotal evidence, as Van 
Rooyen does, will be far more likely to emphasize violence. Violence impacts on 
older people who have more contacts in the community and who are more likely to 
report that they are emigrating at the border. Thus they are better known than recent 
graduates who emigrate to find jobs. 
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Chapter 6: Concluding chapter 
This paper has explained emigration from South Africa from 1980 to 2000. The 
conclusion will first briefly describe the results from the different sections in the 
paper. 
Chapter 1 : showed that emigration from South Africa has been increasing during the 
late 1990's and has probably reached a historical peak. Furthermore it showed that 
South Africans were dissatisfied with a range of issues in South Africa. These 
included real incomes, violence, the future and government expenditure and taxation. 
This chapter provided for the rest of the paper that analyzed these factors in tum. 
Chapter 2: provided the theoretical basis for the papers discussion. 
Chapter 3 showed that immigration restrictions into the destination countries were 
relaxed during the 1990's. In particular New Zealand introduced the points system 
during the early 1990's. It was shown that immigration regulations in the US made it 
the most difficult country for South Africans to enter. 
Chapter 4, Sections 2 and 3: showed that real wages were the primary driver of trends 
in emigration from South Africa from 1980 to 2000. It also showed places in which 
declining immigration restrictions could have increased emigration. 
Chapter 4, Section 5: showed that emigration had responded in the past to political 
events. It also showed that some of the increase during the late 1990' s could have 
been caused by a decrease in uncertainty about the future. 
Chapter 5, Section 1: showed that unemployment had increased during the late 1990's 
across the board. The analysis showed that there may be an emigration trap 
developing as a result of experienced people emigrating. 
Chapter 5, Section 2: showed that South African experienced a unique combination of 
violent robbery and homicide. The result is that skilled South Africans experience an 
unparalleled level of random homicide by strangers. Homicide increased dramatically 
during the early 1990's but then stabilized and declined slightly during the late 
1990's. Thus while increasing homicide is a very likely reason for emigration during 
the late 1990's it's impact on emigration should decline during the new century. 
In conclusion 
While Chapter 4 showed that the increase in emigration during the late 1990's had 
been contributed to by financial incentives (Chapter 4, section 2 and 3) and political 
events (Chapter 4, section 5) the dramatic increases experienced in Australia and the 
UK probably could not be explained purely by these factors. Therefore it is likely that 
violence (Chapter 5, section 2) and unemployment (Chapter 5, Section 1) all 
contributed to the dramatic increases in emigration. Furthermore it is likely that 
opening borders in the destination countries (Chapter 3) also contributed to the 
increase during the late 1990's. 
93 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
p
 To
wn
This paper has shown the often overlooked importance of financial incentives to 
trends in emigration and provided a framework with which the effect of political 
events could be understood. It does not though exclude the possibility that violence 
and unemployment impacted on emigration during the late 1990's. Proving this will 
require further research. 
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Appendix 1 
Homicide amongst the educated in South Africa 
A non representative sample of police stations was taken for Pretoria, Cape Town and 
Johannesburg. Police stations with below average murder rates were chosen from 
(Louw, 2001). This was Only Police stations in suburbs that the census explicitly 
covered were included (22 police stations were excluded for this reason). The census 
sometimes splits suburbs up or registers the data under different suburbs. The police 
stations that were in suburbs with high education levels were chosen (5 stations were 
excluded because the occurred in suburbs with low levels of education). This left 24 
stations in suburbs with proportion of educated ranging from 13% to 30%. The table 
below shows the suburbs used and the proportion of the population that has tertiary 
education. 
education 
Johannesbur 
Parkview 30.76079005 
Linden 24.54144416 
Sandrin ham 21.60493827 
Norwood 25.15438452 
20.21803766 
18.18845873 
23.04147465 
Kirstenhof 
Die River 
Lansdowne 0.138831933 
Claremont 0.325689743 
0.311120727 
0.138801694 
0.241072342 
0.320920044 
32.97844716 
ein 29.31898186 
Sinoville 19.54988747 
Pretoria North 10.40737437 
Wonderboom 24.42407146 
Villieria 16.66990291 
Silverton 13.96319018 
Table 4 Proportion of population with tertiary education in suburbs reviewed 
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The table below shows the number of murders and manslaughters for these suburbs: 
Proportion of 
population 
with tertiary 
education 
Murder 
Johannesburg (1996) Manslaughter (1996) 
Parkview 30.76079005 8 4 
Linden 24.54144416 ~ 15 • Sand ring ham 21.60493827 13 I Norwood 25.15438452 14 Rosebank 20.21803766 8 ~elY 21 20 
andton 23.04147465 27 45 
Cape Town 
Rondebosch 0.361615309 2 3 
Kirstenhof 0.24674221 9 7 
Diep River 0.208453016 2 6 
Lansdowne 0.138831933 
=t ili Claremont 0.325689743 
Mowbray 0.311120727 3 9 
Simonstown 0.138801694 3 2 
Sea Point 0.241072342 13 13 
Camps Bay 0.320920044 1 2 
Pretoria 
Brooklyn 32.97844716 8 20 
Garsfontein 29.31898186 4 11 
Sinoville 19.54988747 4 20 I 
Pretoria North 10.40737437 6 9 
wonderbOO~.42407146 4 11 
Villieria 16.66990291 7 9 
Silverton 13.96319018 7 8 
Table 5 Numbers of murders and manslaughters in suburbs with a highly educated population 
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The table below shows the estimated population per station (Population of 
JHB/number of police stations), the resulting homicide rate per 100 000 and the 
estimated stranger murder rate. 
Average 
population 
I Johannesburg 
per station in Hom icides per 100 Stranger homicide 
.IHB 000 per 100000 
i Parkview 36228.2381 33.123333 19.874 
Linden 36228.2381 85.568611 51.34117 
I Sand ring ham 36228.2381 52.445277 31.46717 
~ ..... 
Norwood 36228.2381 77.287777 46.37267 
Rosebank 36228.2381 33.123333 19.874 
Bramely 36228.2381 113.17139 67.90283 
Sandton 36228.2381 198.74 119.244 
Average 
population 
per station in 
~(3pe Town .. C(3pe Town 
Rondebosch 24726.82143 20.220957 12.13257 
Kirstenhof 24726.82143 64.707063 38.82424 
Diep River 24726.82143 32.353532 19.41212 
Lansdowne 24726.82143 68.751255 41.25075 
Slaremont 24726.82143 52.574489 31.54469 
Mowbray 24726.82143 48.530297 29.11818 
Simonstown 24726.82143 20.220957 12.13257 
Sea Point 24726.82143 105.14898 63.08939 
LQ.i:3mpS Bay 24726.82143 12.132574 7.279545 
Average 
population in 
. Pretoria Pretoria 
Lsrooklyn 32326.16129 86.617151 51.97029 
i 
Garsfontein 32326.16129 46.402045 27.84123 
I Sinoville 32326.16129 74.243272 44.54596 
Pretoria North 
r-
32326.16129 46.402045 27.84123 
Wonderboom 32326.16129 46.402045 27.84123 
Villieria 32326.16129 49.495515 29.69731 
Silverton 32326.16129 46.402045 27.84123 
Table 6 Homicide rate per 100000 for suburbs with a high proportion of educated people 
How reliable are those estimates of the homicide rates? 
Obviously when a figure is unexpectedly high and based on level upon level of 
proxies one is unsure about the validity of the results. Population per police station is 
reassuringly similar for all three cities. Similarly murder rates between the cities 
support anecdotal evidence that Johannesburg has the highest homicide rate followed 
by Pretoria and Cape Town. As discussed in the text one expects the proportion of 
stranger homicides for the educated to be far higher than 60%. So the stranger 
homicide rates are probably under estimated. 
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Survey evidence mentioned in the text suggests that 2.5% of White and Asian families 
(fathers, mothers, sisters, brothers, grandparents, aunts and uncles) in Johannesburg 
experience murder in any year, where white and Asian are proxies for educated (again 
this is an underestimation because many families experience more than one 
homicide). This was put in a table to estimate how large a particular family had to be 
to be in line with the homicide rates per 100 000 worked out above (The calculation 
was 2.5%/(percentage of homicides in the suburb). The table is shown below for 
Johannesburg: 
Homicides 
per 100 Family 
Johannesbur 000 Size 
Parkview 33.12333 75.4755 
85.56861 29.21632 
52.44528 47.66873 
Norwood 77.28778 32.34664 
Rosebank 33.12333 75.4755 
113.1714 22.09039 
198.74 12.57925 
Table 7 Derived family size for JHB suburbs 
The table above shows that the family size estimates are too large for most suburbs. 
Thus the homicide rates may be too low rather than too high. 
Conclusion 
Therefore while the above homicide figures are very high, and thus suspicious. The 
approach used as well as other evidence from surveys suggests that the figures are 
more likely to be underestimated than overestimated. 
Appendix 2 
Due to the short period for which unemployment data was available a moving average 
(MA) technique was used. Two types ofMA technique were used. 
The first was a MA on actual levels. The formula for predicting Unemployment (X) in 
time (t) with a three year moving average is shown below: 
This shows a moving average over three years. The results for this and a six year 
moving average are shown. 
The second MA used was a moving average on percentage changes (called MA on 
growth). The formula for predicting X with a three MA using this formula is shown 
below: 
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A three year, a four year, a five year and a six year MA using this formula is 
presented below. 
The graph below shows the performance of all six MA' s presented at predicting 
unemployment one year in advance for the whole time series. These predictions are 
compared to actual unemployment rates to indicate how effective the different 
techniques are. 
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Figure 36 The effectiveness of different forecasting techniques 
-+-SA unemployment rate 
Three year MA on growth 
Four year MA on growth 
__ Fil.e year MA on growth 
__ Six year MA on growth 
-+- Three year MA on actual 
- Six year MA on actual 
The graph shows that the best fit with actual unemployment rates is from the three 
and four year MA on growth. The paper uses a four year MA on growth to make the 
predictions for the missing data points. The results are roughly in line with 
unemployment changes from the October Household Survey. 
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